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What's in a Name: A Critical Look at California's




Costello: Hey, Abbott, tell me the names of the players on our
baseball team so I can say hello to them.
Abbott: Sure. Now, Who's on first, What's on second, I-Don't-
Know on third...
Costello: Now, wait. What's the name of the first baseman?
Abbott: No, What's the name of the second baseman.
Costello: I don't know.
Abbott: He's the third baseman.
Costello: Let's start over.
As Abbott and Costello's "Who's on First" routine so aptly il-
lustrates, sometimes it's hard to tell the players without a score-
card. Similarly, recent California legislative and decisional law re-
specting the characterization of marital property has left both the
bench and the bar feeling like poor Lou Costello. Just when you
thought you could correctly identify community property, the
rules have changed yet another time. The rules are almost as con-
fusing as Abbott and Costello's famous routine but with much
more at stake.
One of the great anomalies of the marital property area is that
the current law, while appropriate in a commercial environment,
is not suitable to an intrafamily setting. Individuals who would not
hesitate to seek legal advice in other areas of the law where their
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law
1. This hard copy is an abbreviated form of the piece most commonly performed by
Bud Abbott and Lou Costello as found in Fireside Book of Baseball 347-48 (1956).
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property rights are potentially implicated generally seek no advice
at all when taking title to marital property. To accommodate this
anomaly, the law respecting marital property characterization
should comport with the expectations of parties and, to the extent
possible, yield consistent results. Instead, the current body of law
in this area is so confusing that only the most astute family law
practitioner or jurist is not still wondering who's on first.
In 1983, as part of a long line of legislative attempts to bring
consistency and simplicity into the arena of marital property law,3
the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 26 which added
sections 4800.1" and 4800.25 to the Civil Code. Assembly Bill 26
2. See generally Estate of Blair, 199 Cal. App. 3d 161, 244 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988);
Griffith, Joint Tenancy Community Property, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1961) [hereinafter
Griffith]; Knutson, California Community Property Law: A Plea for Legislative Study and
Reform, 39 S. CAL_ L. REV. 240 (1966); H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CASES & MATERIALS
ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 7.(2d ed. 1971); Mills, Community Joint Ten-
ancy-A Paradoxical Problem in Estate Administration, 49 CAL ST. BJ. 388 (1974)
[hereinafter Mills]; Reppy, Debt Collection from Married Californians: Problems Caused
by Transmutations, Single-Spouse Management, and Invalid Marriage, 18 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 143 (1981) [hereinafter Reppy, Debt Collection]; Comment, Form of Title Pre-
sumptions in California Community Property Law: The Test for a "Common Understand-
ing or Agreement," 15 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 95 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Form of
Title]; Bruch, The Definition and Division of Marital Property in California: Towards
Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS LJ. 769 (1982) [hereinafter Bruch, California Mari-
tal Property]; Sterling, Joint Tenancy and Community Property in California, 14 PAC. L.J.
927 (1983) [hereinafter Sterling]; Mennell, Community Property with Right of Survivor-
ship, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779 (1983) [hereinafter Mennell]; Abney, Impact of Califor-
nia Community Property Presumptions on Joint Tenancy, 13 COMM. PROP. J. 40 (1987);
Comment, The 1986 Amendments to California Civil Code Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2:
Irreconcilable Differences Between the Legislature and the Court?, 20 PAc. U. 97 (1988).
3. Abney, Joint Tenancy/Community Property Presumption and Separate Property
Reimbursement: Legislative History of California Law Provides Guidance, 11 CoMM.
PROP. J. 275, 276-79 (1984).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1, added by 1983 Cal. Stats. ch 342, § 1 (West Supp.
1986), amended by Stats 1986, ch. 539, § 1 (West Supp. 1989). Section 4800.1, added by
Cal. Stats., ch. 342, § 1 states:
For the purpose of division of property upon dissolution of marriage or legal sepa-
ration, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint tenancy form is
presumed to be community property. This presumption is a presumption affecting
the burden of proof and may be rebutted by either of the following:
(a) A clear statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title by
which the property is acquired that the property is separate property and not com-
munity property.
(b) Proof that the parties have made a written agreement that the property is
separate property.
Section 4800.1, amended by Stats 1986, ch. 539, § 1, states:
(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares as follows:
(1) It is the public policy of this state to provide uniformly and consistently for
the standard of proof in establishing the character of property acquired by spouses
during marriage in joint title form, and for the allocation of community and sepa-
rate interest in that property between the spouses.
(2) The methods provided by case and statutory law have not resulted in consis-
tency in the treatment of spouses' interests in property which they hold in joint
title, but rather, have created confusion as to which law applies at a particular
2
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made a number of changes to the law governing spousal joint ten-
ancies. For the purpose of division of property at marital dissolu-
tion or legal separation only, section 4800.1 extends the single-
family residence community property presumption of California
Civil Code section 51106 to all spousal joint tenancies and adds a
writing requirement in order to rebut the presumption. Section
4800.2 creates a non-interest bearing7 right of reimbursement in a
point in time to property, depending on the form of title, and, as a result, spouses
cannot have reliable expectations as to the characterization of their property and
the allocation of the interests therein, and attorneys cannot reliably advise their
clients regarding applicable law.
(3) Therefore, the Legislature finds that a compelling state interest exists to
provide for uniform treatment of property; thus the Legislature intends that the
forms of this section and Section 4800.2 operative on January 1, 1987, shall apply
to all property held in joint title regardless of the date of acquisition of the prop-
erty or the date of any agreement affecting the character of the property, and that
the form of this section and that form of Section 4800.2 are applicable in all
proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1984. However, the form of this
section and the form of Section 4800.2 operative on January 1, 1987, are not
applicable to property settlement agreements executed prior to January 1, 1987, or
proceedings in which judgments were rendered prior to January 1, 1987, regard-
less of whether those judgments have become final.
(b) For the purpose of division of property upon dissolution of marriage or legal
separation, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form, includ-
ing property held in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, or
as community property is presumed to be community property. This presumption
is a presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted by either of
the following:
(1) A clear statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title by which
the property is acquired that the property is separate property and not community
property.
(2) Proof that the parties have made a written agreement that the property is
separate property.
5. CAL CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1986). Section 4800.2 states:
In the division of community property under this part unless a party has made a
written waiver of the right to reimbursement or signed a writing that has the
effect of a waiver, the party shall be reimbursed for his or her contributions to the
acquisition of the property to the extent the party traces the contributions to a
separate property source. The amount reimbursed shall be without interest or ad-
justment for change in monetary values and shall not exceed the net value of the
property at the time of the division. As used in this section, "contributions to the
acquisition of the property" include downpayments, payments for improvements,
and payments that reduce the principal of a loan used to finance the purchase or
improvement of the property but do not include payments of interest on the loan
or payments made for maintenance, insurance, or taxation of the property.
6. In addition to adding sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 to the Civil Code, A.B. 26 also
amended California Civil Code section 5 110 to delete the provision relating to classification
for the purpose of dissolution of a joint tenancy single-family residence acquired during
marriage. This presumption was first added to the Civil Code in 1965 by the addition of
the provision containing the presumption to former section 164, (originally enacted 1872;
amended by Stats. 1965 ch. 1710, p.3843, § 1) and replaced in 1970 by section 5110
(added by Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, p. 3339, § 8). See generally Final Rep. of Assem. Interim
Comm. on Judiciary Relating to Domestic Relations (1965), 2 APPEN. TO ASSEM. J. 1, 117-
25 (1965) [hereinafter Domestic Relations].
7. This version was changed substantially from the form originally promulgated by
3
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spouse who can trace contributions to the acquisition of commu-
nity property to a separate property source. Initially, the Califor-
nia Law Revision Commission had proposed section 4800.1 as a
replacement for the "less direct and less adequate"'8 5110 commu-
nity property presumption for a single-family residence acquired
by husband and wife in joint tenancy form rather than extending
the reach of 5110 to all property acquired by the spouses in joint
tenancy form.9 In its Recommendation Relating to Division of
Joint Tenancy and Tenancy in Common Property at Dissolution
of Marriage, the Commission stated that the purpose of the addi-
tion of section 4800.1 was to give courts in dissolution or legal
separation proceedings the jurisdiction to settle all of the marital
the California Law Revision Commission in September 1982. That proposed section 4800.1
read as follows:
4800.l.Notwithstanding any other law:
(a) In a proceeding for the division of the community property and the quasi-
community property the court has jurisdiction, at the request of either party, to
divide the interest of the parties in real and personal property wherever situated
and whenever acquired, held by the parties as joint tenants or tenants in common.
The division shall be made in the same manner and to the same extent and subject
to the same limitations, as community property and quasi-community property.
(b) For the purpose of this section the interests of the parties in the property are
presumed to be equal. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of
proof and is rebuttable by proof of different proportionate contributions of the
parties to the acquisition of the property or by proof of an agreement of the par-
ties that their interest in the property are different.
(c) If property held in joint tenancy is divided pursuant to this section, the inter-
locutory judgment of dissolution of the marriage or the judgement decreeing the
legal separation of the parties severs the joint tenancy.
(d) This section applies to proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1984,
regardless of whether the property was acquired before, on, or after January 1,
1984.
Recommendation Relating to Division of Joint Tenancy and Tenancy in Common Prop-
erty at Dissolution of Marriage, 16 Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Reports 2165, 2171-72
(1982) [hereinafter 16 Comm'n Rpts].
The Legislative history of the section sheds little light on the reasons for its final form.
See Report of Senate Committee on Judiciary on Assembly Bill 26, 83 Senate Journal
Regular Session 4865-66 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Sen. Rept.] for the only language ex-
pressing the intent of the Legislature in promulgating such a drastically revised § 4800.1
and 4800.2 from the 1982 version found at 16 Comm'n Rpts supra, at 2171-73: "Assembly
Bill 26 is jointly recommended by the California Law Revision Commission and the State
Bar Conference of Delegates. It is a substantially revised version of the commission's Rec-
ommendation Relating to Division of Joint Tenancy and Tenancy in Common Property at
Dissolution of Marriage, 16 Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Reports 2165 (1982). The revisions
are designed to avoid tax and theoretical problems raised by practitioners concerning the
original recommendation." By 1985, when the legislature enacted Civil Code § 4800.4, the
tax problem attendant to division of separate property at dissolution had been solved. See
Recommendation Relating to Dividing Jointly Owned Property at Dissolution, 18 CAL L.
REVISION COMrM'N 149, 153 (1986). [hereinafter 18 Comm'n Rpts]. By that time 4800.1 in
its present form had already been enacted.
8. 16 Comm'n Rpts, supra note 7, at 2172.
9. 16 Comm'n Rpts, supra note 7, at 2172-74; Domestic Relations, supra note 6, at
121-25; Bruch, California Marital Property, supra note 2, at 831.
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property rights of the parties including their respective rights in
joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common property, historically sepa-
rate property estates. Although joint tenancy property would be
presumed to belong equally to each spouse for the purpose of divi-
sion, this presumption could be rebutted by a showing of different
proportionate contributions.10
Notwithstanding such legislative history, the thrust of Assembly
Bill 26 was something quite different. The Report of the Senate
Committee on Judiciary on A.B. 26 states that a primary purpose
of A.B. 26 is to require a writing rather than parol evidence to
rebut the community property presumption of section 4800.1, as
well as to reverse the gift presumption articulated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Lucas." The change in
10. 16 Comm'n Rpts supra note 7, at 2172; note the similarity between 1982 pro-
posed version of 4800.1 and Cal. Civ. Code § 4800.4 (West Supp. 1989) adopted in 1985
and applicable to all proceedings for divisions of marital property commenced after Janu-
ary 1, 1986, which states in applicable part:
(a) In a proceeding for division of the community property and the quasi-commu-
nity property, the court has jurisdiction, at the request of either party, to divide
the separate property interests of the parties in real and personal property, wher-
ever situated and whenever acquired, held by the parties as joint tenants or te-
nants in common. The property shall be divided together with, and in accordance
with the same procedure for and limitations on, division of community property
and quasi-community property.
The main difference between 4800.1, as originally proposed in 1982 and 4800.4, as en-
acted in 1985, is in the rebuttal standard required to rebut the presumption of the spouses'
equal interests in the property. In the 1982 version of 4800.1, the presumption could be
rebutted by a showing of different proportions, effectively tracing. In the 1985 version of
4800.4, the court is simply given jurisdiction to divide the jointly-held property according
to the guidelines of 4800.1 and 4800.2.
Prior to the adoption of section 4800.4, Cal. Civ. Code 4800 (West Supp. 1989) gave the
courts in proceedings to divide marital property jurisdiction over only the "community es-
tate" including community and quasi-community property. Bruch, California Marital
Property, supra note 2, at 843. The enactment of section 4800.4 extends that jurisdiction
to all property held by the parties as joint tenants and tenants in common at the request of
either party and specifically amends section 4800 and reverses prior case law to the con-
trary. 18 Comn'n Rpts, supra note 7.
11. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980). In Lucas, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court finally addressed the issues attendant to a mixed community/separate
asset: determination of the character of the property and apportionment of the fair market
value of the asset between the two estates at marital dissolution. The Lucas court was
faced with the common situation in which marital property is purchased during marriage
with the separate property down payment of one of the spouses and community property
contributions to the paydown of the loan.
At the advice of their real estate agent, Brenda and Gerald Lucas had taken title to their
house in 1968 as joint tenants thereby invoking the community property presumption of
section 164. The court held that the affirmative act of taking title removes the property
from the general community property presumption which may normally be rebutted by
tracing the property to a separate property source and raises the rebuttal standard to re-
quire an agreement between the spouses that the property is of different character than as
set forth in the document of title. If the separate property proponent can prove such an
agreement, then the court may use the apportionment formula approved in In re Marriage
of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). If no agreement is proved,
19891
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section 4800.1 from a division on divorce statute to one which
both creates a presumption and raises the evidentiary burden of
rebutting such presumption and the addition of section 4800.2 to
the Civil Code has created more problems than solutions. Section
4800.1 overturns previous case law by creating a statute of frauds
requirement to rebut the evidentiary presumption of form of title
where one had never been required in the past. Section 4800.2
overturns the separate property gift presumption recognized by
Lucas and creates a right of reimbursement in the separate prop-
erty contributor which is inconsistent with any previous apportion-
ment scheme.12 In addition, the California Supreme Court has
taken a contradictory position to the retroactive application of
4800.1 and 4800.2 on the grounds that both impair property
rights which vest upon the "acquisition" of the property in joint
tenancy without due process of law.13
the separate property is deemed a gift to the community. It is this gift presumption which
the legislature found unfair and the impetus for promulgating 4800.2 as remedial
legislation.
For an excellent discussion of what evidence is required to rebut the various property
characterization presumptions, see Justice Donald King's now depublished opinion in Mar-
riage of Buol, 159 Cal. App. 3d 174 (1984) and HOGOBOOM & KING, Cal. Prac. Guide:
Fain. Law I §§ 8.9-8.102 (TRG. 1987) [hereinafter HOGOBOOM & KING].
The Senate Report noted the inconsistency of allowing parol evidence to rebut presump-
tions regarding property where the statute of frauds would otherwise require a writing.
1983 Sen. Rept, supra note 9 at 4865. See also Mills, supra note 2, at n. 6; Reppy, Debt
Collection, supra note 2, at 159-68.
12. The 4800.2 right of reimbursement ignores the concept that property acquired
during marriage may be an admixture of community and separate property and therefore
properly apportionable between the two estates. In so legislating, it is interesting to specu-
late whether California has indirectly adopted the view held by the majority of community
property states that the character of the initial contributions determines the character of
the property. Under either of the "inception-of-rights" or "time-of-vesting" analysis, the
"out" estate may only be reimbursed for contributions to the property. BLUMBERG, COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 275-76 (1987).
If this is the case, it is arguably true only for separate contributions to community prop-
erty. (See In re Marriage of Leversee, 156 Cal. App. 3d 891, 203 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1984)
for the rule that 4800.1 applies only to joint-titled property acquired after marriage. How-
ever, 4800.1 does apply to property acquired prior to marriage but where the joint form of
title is taken after marriage.) Community contributions to separate property still appear to
be governed by the apportionment of ownership rules. In re Marriage of Frick, 181 Cal.
App. 3d 997, 226 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1986); HOGOBOOM & KING, supra note 11, §§ 8.76-
8.78, at 8-59 -8-63.
13. In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985);
In re Marriage of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715, P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986);
Perkal v. Perkal, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1198, 250 Cal Rptr. 296 (1988); Bankovich v.
Bankovich, 203 Cal. App, 3d 49, 249 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988); (holding amended 4800.2
inapplicable to reimburse the separate property spouse with no Lucas agreement for prop-
erty acquired prior to 1984 although pleadings filed post-1984 and judgment entered post-
1987); In re Marriage of Hopkins & Axene, 199 Cal. App. 3d 288, 244 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1988) (following the rule in In re Marriage of Griffis, 187 Cal. App. 3d 156, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1986) that the Buol/Fabian "date" for 4800.1 is when it becomes too late for
the community to get a written waiver of the automatic right to reimbursement); In re
Marriage of Cairo, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 251 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1988) (waiver of 4800.2
6
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To exacerbate matters further in this already tumultuous area
of the law, the 4800.1 and 4800.2 presumptions apply only in mat-
ters of marital dissolution or legal separation. They specifically do
not apply to other situations where form of title may be relevant
to the disposition of marital property such as in the disposition of
marital property at the death of one of the spouses. The effect of
the 4800.1 presumption is to extend the concept of the hybrid es-
tate-community property engrafted with a right of survivor-
ship-first created by Civil Code section 164.14 While the recogni-
tion of such an estate may have been on the legislative agenda,
nowhere in the scanty legislative history of A.B. 26 is it
expressed. 15
The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate the current
and future effects of 4800.1 and 4800.2 with respect to Califor-
nia's current system of characterizing marital property. It is the
contention of this author that the legislature, seeking simplicity in
the rules governing the characterization of marital property, has
formulated a rigid set of rules which are easy to apply but inflexi-
ble.1" The new legislation is deficient in a number of respects.
First, it reflects the legislature's uncertainty about what
right of reimbursement is subject to all of the same defenses as any contract); In re Mar-
riage of Lockman, 204 Cal. App. 3d 782, 251 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1988); In re Marriage of
Reilley, as modified, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 242 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1987) (4800.2 does not
apply to pre-1984 proceedings where the property was acquired prior to 1984); In re Mar-
riage of Colombo, as modified, 197 Cal. App. 3d 572, 242 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1987); In re
Marriage of Witt, 197 Cal. App. 3d 122, 242 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1987) (lack of a written
waiver of reimbursement for a post-1984 separate property contribution triggers the appli-
cation of 4800.2 regardless of the finding of a Lucas agreement to the contrary); Comment,
The 1986 Amendments to California Civil Code Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2: Irreconcila-
ble Differences Between the Legislature and the Court?, 20 PAc. L.J. 97 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Irreconcilable Differences]; Flagg, Respecting Reliance: A Standard for Due Process
Review of California's Retroactive Community Property Legislation, 14 CoMIM. PROP. J.
14 (1988) [hereinafter Flagg]; but see Reppy, Applying New Law to Preenactment Acqui-
sitions-Must Prior Law be "'Rankly Unjust"? Part Two, 15 (3) COMM. PROP. J. 1 (1989)
[hereinafter Reppy, Rankly Unjust I1]; Reppy, Applying New Law to Preenactment Ac-
quisitions-Must Prior Law be "Rankly Unjust"?, 15 COMM. PROP. J. 1 (1988). [hereinaf-
ter Reppy, Rankly Unjust I].
14. See supra note 6; Griffith supra note 2; Domestic Relations, supra note 6, at
122; Reppy, Debt Collection, supra note 2, at 147.
15. As opposed to California's sub silentio recognition of the estate of survivorship
marital property, the Uniform Marital Property Act expressly creates such an estate in
order to combine the benefits of marital property at dissolution and the avoidance of pro-
bate at the death of the first spouse to die. Uniform Marital Property Act § 11 (ULA
1983) [hereinafter UMPA].
16. At least one appellate court, criticizing the supreme's court's rule in Lucas, has
noted that the search for a simple and easily-applied solution often causes difficulties be-
cause of the inherent inflexibility of the solution. Such solutions are often inappropriate
because they ignore the human conduct in marriages including the fact that the party
whose rights are adversely affected usually acts without legal advice and without knowl-
edge of the consequences of his or her actions. Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal. App. 3d 780,
201 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984).
19891
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problems this reform legislation is supposed to redress. Section
4800.1 can be read as a legislative attempt to accomplish all of
the following: (1) create a statutory community property pre-
sumption for all jointly-held marital property for purposes of
property division at marital dissolution; (2) create indirectly a hy-
brid marital property estate-survivorship community property;
(3) give the court, in matters of marital property division, jurisdic-
tion over all jointly-held marital property; and (4) force married
couples to treat their mixed property transactions as if they were
in a commercial setting by the requirement of a writing to rebut
the community property presumption.1
Section 4800.2, while expressly directed at reversing the former
presumption of a separate property gift to the community, fails to
recognize the concept that marital property may be wholly com-
munity, wholly separate or an admixture of both. By adopting re-
imbursement as a remedy for the separate property estate, it sub
silentio adopts a form of the doctrine inception of title18 hereto-
fore unrecognized in California and creates confusion about the
continued viability of the doctrine of pro rata apportionment.
Second, while a presumption in favor of the community in am-
biguous situations is desirable, it is possible that the legislature
has gone beyond the constraints of human conduct in a marital
situation by requiring a writing to maintain a separate property
pro rata interest. In order to prevent the abrogation of his prop-
erty rights, the separate property contributor must obtain a writ-
ing signed by his spouse in the nature of a premarital agree-
ment.19 Absent such a writing, the separate property contributor
may have simple reimbursement. While such a writing would pro-
vide a court with clear evidence of the character of such property,
most spouses who enter into such mixed-character transactions do
so without either legal advice or any idea of the legal consequence
of making a separate property contribution to property acquired
by the community. The result is not even a consistent one; when
the community estate makes a contribution to a separate property
asset, if the community can trace its contribution, it is entitled to
full pro rata apportionment of the appreciation as well as reim-
bursement for its contribution.2"
17. Id.
18. Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490, 109 S.W. 911 (1908).
19. The difficulty with premarital agreements is that most people contemplating
marriage intuitively feel that they are counter productive, that is, they discourage rather
than encourage harmonious relations. Certainly the same can be said for writing require-
ments to preserve separate property interests during marriage.
20. Marriage of Moore, 38 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 268 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980);
Marriage of Frick, 181 Cal. App. 3d 997, 226 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1986); Marriage of Mars-
[Vol. 26
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Third, the enactment of 4800.1 and 4800.2 creates confusion in
a number of areas. For example, since 4800.1 is triggered only at
marital dissolution or legal separation, all former presumptions
are still applicable in nondissolution situations. Recently the
Fourth District Court of Appeals addressed this very issue in Es-
tate of Blair.
21
In June 1985, Ray and Nancy Blair separated after 22 years of
marriage. Nancy petitioned for legal separation listing their home,
held in joint tenancy, as "community property." Ray responded
by requesting dissolution of the marriage and confirmation of sep-
arate and community assets. In his 1985 deposition, Ray testified
that he "believed" that the home was community property.
22
Thereafter, Nancy Blair executed a new will leaving her entire
estate to her sister.
Nancy died prior to the trial in the dissolution action and her
sister was appointed as the executrix of her estate. On the inven-
tory and appraisement, her sister did not list the house as a part of
Nancy's probate estate. In February, 1986, Ray Blair filed an affi-
davit of death of joint tenant with the Office of the County Re-
corder and subsequently sold the house to a bona fide purchaser."
In September 1986, the executrix of Nancy's estate claimed for
the estate a one-half interest in the house, or alternatively in the
proceeds of sale, based on the community property character of
the property. 4 The trial court ordered Ray to pay the estate one-
den, 130 Cal. App. 3d 426, 282 Cal. Prtr. 910 (1982); Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222,
251 P. 640 (1926).
21. 199 Cal. App. 3d 161, 244 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988).
22. In Blair, the trial court found evidence of a transmutation of the property from
joint tenancy to community property in Nancy Blair's Petition for Legal Separation (which
would have been sufficient to sever the joint tenancy under proposed 4800.1(c), 16 Comm'n
Rpts, supra note 7, at 2172) and in Ray Blair's deposition in the dissolution of marriage
proceedings. The appeals court held these declarations to be inadequate to constitute an
agreement to transmute in that it was likely that Ray had been told by his attorney that
4800.1 was controlling in a dissolution of marriage situation essentially nullifying his decla-
ration for purposes of death. Estate of Blair at 168, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 631. For what consti-
tutes adequate transmutation in dissolution pleadings, see Estate of Baglione, 165 Cal. 2d
192, 195, 417 P.2d 683, 686, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139, 142 (1966).
23. Once an affidavit of death of joint tenant (California Probate Code sections 210-
12) is properly recorded, a subsequent purchaser takes the property with notice of title to
the whole property as vested in the surviving joint tenant. Title insurance companies, when
insuring title in the surviving joint tenant, generally accept the affidavit procedure for ter-
minating the joint tenancy. CEB, I CALIFORNIA DECEDENT ESTATE PRACTICE § 4.18
(1989).
24. The effect of the 4800.1 presumption is to extend the concept of the hybrid estate
(community property engrafted with a right of survivorship) first created by Civil Code
Section 164. See Griffith, supra note 2; Domestic Relations, supra note 6, at 122; Reppy,
Debt Collection, supra note 2, at 147. Nowhere in the legislative history of A.B. 26 is the
intent of the legislature to recognize such an estate expressed. As opposed to this sub silen-
tio recognition of the estate, the Uniform Marital Property Act expressly creates such an
estate in order to combine the benefits of marital property at dissolution and the avoidance
1989]
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half of the proceeds of sale of the house plus interest finding that
the house was community property based on a prior agreement
between Nancy and Ray transmuting the property from joint ten-
ancy to community property. 5
The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court on a
number of issues one of which was a determination of whether an
agreement to transmute the house from joint tenancy to commu-
nity property had occurred. 6 While the court agreed that the Jan-
uary 1, 1984 version of section 4800.12 creates a presumption that
property acquired during marriage in joint tenancy form is com-
munity property, this presumption applies only for the purpose of
division of property upon dissolution of marriage or legal separa-
tion.28 Since the issue as to the character of property in Blair
arose in the context of the death of one of the spouses, section
4800.1 is not applicable.
When section 4800.1 does not apply, the joint tenancy form of
title presumption attaches.2 9 A form of title presumption may only
be rebutted by a Lucas-type agreement by the spouses to the con-
trary;30 if such a presumption cannot be overcome by evidence of
an agreement, then the surviving spouse takes the whole by right
of survivorship. Absent an agreement to the contrary, the common
law form of title presumption is controlling despite the fact that
right of survivorship could not have been within the expectation of
of probate at the death of the first spouse to die. Uniform Marital Property Act § 11 (ULA
1983) [hereinafter UMPA]. See also Sterling, supra note 2, at 951 describing the right of
survivorship as the "grand" and "disguising" incident of joint tenancies.
25. See cases cited infra note 47.
26. The transmutation issue in Blair revolved around whether the alleged transmuta-
tion had taken place before the effective date of Cal. Civ. Code section 5110.730 which
imposes a writing requirement on transmutations made during marriage on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1985.
27. The Blair court did not have to deal with the Buol/Fabian retroactivity issue
since it found § 4800.1 inapplicable to the facts of Blair.
28. See supra note 4.
29. Refer to Siberell and companion cases infra.
30. What exactly constitutes a Lucas agreement is still relevant in light of the su-
preme court's decisions in Buol and Fabian as to the retroactive effect of sections 4800.1
and 4800.2. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. For what constitutes an effective
transmutation, see Adams & Sevitch, Cal. Fam. L. Rep. § D.45.1 -D.48 (7th ed. 1988)
[hereinafter Adams & Sevitch]. Oral transmutations or transmutations by the conduct of
the parties are effective only to transmute from spousal joint tenancies to community prop-
erty; the statute of frauds requirement of Civil Code section 683 makes an oral transmuta-
tion in the other direction impossible; accord Wheeland v. Rogers, 20 Cal. 2d 218, 124
P.2d 816 (1942); California Trust Co. v. Bennet, 33 Cal. 2d 694, 204 P.2d 324 (1949). Of
course, post-January 1, 1985 oral transmutations are entirely impermissible following the
enactment of four new provisions added to the Civil Code in 1984 which add a writing
requirement for an effective transmutation. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5110.710-740 (West Supp.
1989). For a discussion of the probable effects of the new transmutation statutes, see infra
notes 239-51 and accompanying text.
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the parties involved in a marital dissolution proceeding.31
The Blair court, in dicta, noted the unevenness and unfairness
resulting from a chameleon-like community property presumption
which arises at marriage, continues to legal separation or dissolu-
tion of marriage, disappears at death, and potentially reappears
again at intestate succession. 2 Whereas one of the functions of
evidentiary presumptions is to inject certainty and predictability
into the law by providing that certain conclusions be drawn when
other facts are proved, the unevenness of the application of com-
munity property presumptions tends instead toward uncertainty
and confusion.
33
The historic starting point of the California system of charac-
terizing marital property as community or separate is the pre-
sumption.3 4 Since one of the acknowledged purposes of presump-
tions is to accord a certain amount of predictability to the
resolution of legal disputes, it should be enlightening to explore
both the legislative and judicial history which have lead instead to
California's currently chaotic law respecting the characterization
of marital property.
I. HISTORIC OVERVIEW
At the 1849 constitutional convention, California officially
adopted the community property concept of marital property em-
bodied in Spanish civil law.35 In doing so, California followed
Texas and Louisiana in rejecting the English common law gov-
erning marital property. Notwithstanding its apparent adoption of
a marital property system which recognized each spouse's interest
in the community as vested upon acquisition, California's commit-
ment to a community property system can best be described as
equivocal. 36 California continued to retain many separate property
31. Estate of Blair at 169, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
32. Id. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
33. The holding in Blair raises an interesting potential legal malpractice issue which
requires lawyers representing parties in dissolution proceedings to promptly partition all
community property held in joint tenancy in order to avoid the adverse and unexpected
consequences of Blair. Id.; accord Adams & Sevitch, supra note 30, at 3629. See supra
note 22 and infra note 255 for a discussion re the permissibility of unilateral severance of
joint tenancies in California. See also 16 Comm'n Rpts, supra note 7, at 2172 where the
California Law Revision Commission recognized the potential for this problem and at-
tempted to solve it in proposed § 4800.1(c) by having the interlocutory judgement of disso-
lution effect a severance of spousal joint tenancies.
34. REPPY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 64 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
cited as REPPY].
35. Cal. Const. art. XI, § 14 (1849).
36. See generally, Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in Cali-
fornia's Community Property System, 1849 - 1975, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter Prager]. See notes infra and accompanying text.
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concepts as part of its community property framework including
the recognition of spouses' legal ability to hold title to property in
joint tenancy.
37
One consequence of adopting a marital property system is the
need to properly characterize property acquired during marriage
as either community38 or separate.39 This requirement is more
compelling when the marital property system evolves in tandem
with a system for separate property ownership between spouses."'
37. See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
38. Community property is defined by negative inference in California. Bruch, Cali-
fornia Marital Property, supra note 2, at 779. Only separate property is defined in the
constitution. Cal. Const. art. I, § 21. Community property is defined in Cal. Civ. Code §
5110 (West Supp. 1989) as follows:
Except as provided in Sections 5107, 5108 and 5126, all real property situation in
this state and all personal property wherever situated acquired during the mar-
riage by a married person while domiciled in this state... is community property
39. The Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5107 and 5108 (West 1983) define separate property as:
All property of the wife (husband), owned by her (him) before marriage, and that
acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with the rents, issues, and
profits thereof, is her (his) separate property. The wife (husband) may, without
the consent of her husband (his wife), convey her (his) separate property.
40. Although courts have held that the same property may not be both joint tenancy
and community property (Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 773, 7 P.2d 1003, 1005
(1932)), it is quite possible that because of the different rebuttal standards at dissolution
and death, both estates can exist in the same property. Joint tenancy historically is a sepa-
rate property estate which may exist between and among related or unrelated parties
wherein the joint tenants are said to have an undivided interest in the whole. Joint tenan-
cies are unilaterally severable in California. See Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524,
162 Cal Rptr. 530 (1980) and text accompanying notes 257-264 infra (unilateral severance
of joint tenancy permissible for real property); but see Estate of Propst, 201 Cal. App. 3d
512, 247 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1988) and note 255 infra (unilateral severance of joint tenancy
personal property not permitted); see also Fetters, (An Invitation to Commit Fraud: Secret
Destruction of Joint Tenant Survivorship Rights, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 173 (1986) [here-
inafter Fetters] (spousal joint tenancies are an invitation for one spouse to commit fraud on
the other by the use of unilateral severance). The most compelling incident of the joint
tenancy estate is the right of survivorship among the tenants; because of the right of survi-
vorship, joint tenancy property is not alienable at the death of a joint tenant.
Community property is an estate recognized in only eight jurisdictions: California,
Texas, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, New Mexico, Idaho and Louisiana. See Weisberger,
The Wisconsin Marital Property Act: Highlights of the Wisconsin Experience in Develop-
ing a Model for Comprehensive Common Law Property Reform, 1 WIscoNsIN WOMEN'S
L.J. 6 (1985); Taylor & Raabe, Wisconsin's Uniform Marital Property Act: Community
Property Moves East, 12 COMM. PROP. J. 83 (1985); Comment, The Development of Shar-
ing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1269 (1981)
[hereinafter Comment, Sharing Principles]. Compare Oldham, Is the Concept of Marital
Property Outdated, 22 J. FAM. L. 263 (1983-84) [hereinafter Oldham]; Glendon, Family
Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REv. 1553 (1984) [hereinafter Glendon]. It is a form
of property ownership that may exist only between spouses for property acquired while
domiciled in California with earnings of the community. Each spouse has a vested one-half
interest in the property regardless of which spouse furnished the consideration. Community
property is not severable during the joint lifetimes of the spouses. At death, community
property is freely alienable by either spouse.
See generally Spitzer, Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship: A Legacy from Thir-
teenth Century England, 16 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 629 (1985); Sterling, supra note 2, at 940-
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To that end, certain presumptions regarding the character of
property have evolved to assist courts in resolving legal disputes
surrounding the character of property.
California Civil Code section 5110 defines community property
as "[AII real property situated in this state and all personal prop-
erty wherever situated acquired during the marriage by a married
person while domiciled in this state."4 It specifically excepts from
this definition all property and any rents, issues, and profits
thereof of either spouse that was owned prior to marriage or ac-
quired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent; everything
that is not community property is separate property. Section 5110
is commonly known as the "time of acquisition" or the "general
community property" presumption and is usually the starting
point from which courts characterize the property of the spouses
at such adjudications as marital dissolution, death of one of the
spouses, and transactions with third parties.
California law has not been clear or consistent about whether
5110 creates an evidentiary presumption or merely states the defi-
nition of community property.42 However, the vast majority of
courts find a presumption in 5110 based on the time that the prop-
erty was acquired. There are basically three approaches that the
courts take in applying the 5110 presumption to the determination
of the character of property. The first approach is represented by
cases which have found a pro-community property presumption to
arise only after the community property proponent has sustained
the burden of proving that the property at issue was acquired dur-
ing marriage.43  The presumption that arises is rebuttable by the
separate property opponent, but if the presumption cannot be re-
butted, then the property at issue, having met the definitional re-
quirements of section 5110, is community property.
57; Bruch, California Marital Property, supra note 2, at 828-42; Prager, supra note 36.
41. Cal. Civ. Code § 5110 (West Supp. 1989).
42. At least one recent appellate court has stated that although the general commu-
nity property or time of acquisition presumption has been associated with section 5110,
such presumption is not mandated by statute but is instead a creation of the courts. In re
Marriage of Lusk, 86 Cal. App. 3d 228, 234, 150 Cal. Rptr. 63, 67-68 (1978); accord
Blumberg supra note 12, at 144; REPPY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 64 (2nd.
ed. 1988) [hereinafter REPPY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY] Professor Reppy points out that
5110 as it currently reads is no more than a definition and that "[F]or the courts to say a
presumption arises upon proof of the basic element of the definition of a legal category is
illogical." Id. at 65. See also Recommendation Relating to Marital Property Presumptions
and Transmutations, 17 CAL. L. REVISION CoMM'N REPORTS 205 (1984) [hereinafter 17
Comm'n Rpts] for the California Law Revision Commission's recommendation of the
adoption of proposed sections 5110.110 - 5110.699 in order to mandate such presumptions
and their evidentiary requirements by statute.
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The second approach provides that a presumption of community
property arises if either husband or wife was in possession of the
property during their marriage."" Clearly, this analysis eases the
burden of the pro-community spouse who is no longer required to
prove time of acquisition but has the advantage of the presump-
tion simply by proving possession during marriage. Under one ver-
sion of this approach, the evidence must show possession after a
long marriage in order to trigger the general presumption.45
Under the third and most favorable approach to the community
property proponent, courts have accorded the separate property
proponent the burden of proving the fact that the property at issue
is separate."' Such an approach essentially turns the 5110 defini-
tion into a true presumption and gives the party alleging the com-
munity character of the property the full benefit of the presump-
tion. While such a line of reasoning seems to occur in only a
minority of cases, one might speculate whether a policy favoring a
marital property system isn't best served by such an approach.
As an integral part of the dual marital property system in Cali-
fornia, the courts have also recognized a so-called common law
presumption which arises in favor of form of title.4 This doctrine
was first articulated by the California Supreme Court 8 in 1934
where the court held that the actual taking title in joint tenancy
created a binding agreement between the spouses the property was
to have the characteristics of joint tenancy rather than community
property.49 In later cases, the court backtracked from its former
44. See, e.g., Lynam v. Vorwerk, 13 Cal. App. 507, II0 P. 355 (1910).
45. Fidelity & Casualty Company v. Mahoney at 68, 161 P. 2d. at 946; Estate of
Duncan, 9 Cal. 2d 207, 217, 70 P.2d 174, 179 (1937); Falk v. Falk, 48 Cal. App.2d 762,
767, 120 P.2d 714, 717 (1941).
46. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 76 Cal. App. 2d 119, 172 P.2d 568 (1946); Smith v.
Smith, 12 Cal. 216 (1859); Estate of Jolly, 196 Cal. 547, 238 P.353 (1925); Meyer v.
Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247 (1859).
47. The form of title presumption arises in both under Civil Code section 5110 ("...
when any.. .property is acquired by husband and wife by an instrument in which they are
described as husband and wife, unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument,
the presumption is that the property is ... community property. . .") and at common law
when title to spousal property is taken in joint tenancy. (In re Marriage of Lucas at 814,
614 at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857; Machado v. Machado, 58 Cal. 2d 501, 506, 375 P.2d
55, 58, 25 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90 (1962). See Comment, Form of Title, supra note 2, at 96.
48. For the first time, the supreme court stated that ". . .as between husband and
wife, a community estate and a joint tenancy cannot exist at the same time in the same
property. The use of community funds to purchase the property and the taking of title
thereto in the name of the spouses as joint tenants is tantamount to a binding agreement
between them that the same shall not thereafter be held as community property but instead
as a joint tenancy with all the characteristics of such an estate." Siberell at 773, 7 P.2d at
1005 (1932).
49. Prior to the enactment of the new post-1985 transmutation statutes, a transmuta-
tion of the character of property from separate to community and community to separate
could occur by a writing, oral agreement, conduct of the spouses, or merely by the facts of
[Vol. 26
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irrefutable position by holding that the joint tenancy form of title
created a rebuttable presumption that the character of the prop-
erty is as stated on the deed.5 0
In a jurisdiction like California, where common law and com-
munity property principles have developed in tandem, spousal
joint tenancies create a unique problem with regard to conflicting
presumptions. 51 For example, property acquired during marriage
which is not otherwise separate property but is titled in joint ten-
ancy with a right of survivorship may be properly characterized as
community having been acquired during marriage as required by
the 5110 definition, or may be characterized as separate, having
given rise to the form of title presumption which is often said to
supersede the 5110 community property presumption.,2 May such
property be characterized as both community and separate? Cer-
tainly, such a hybrid form of property has been recognized implic-
itly since 1965 when the California legislature, in response to a
growing segment of the married population who continued to take
title to their homes in joint tenancy form,53 added to section 164
lariguage which created a presumption for purposes of division of
the property at divorce in favor of characterizing as community
property a single-family residence titled in joint tenancy.54
While the recognition of a survivorship community property es-
tate has been advocated by commentators for a long time,55 the
legislature's treatment of such an estate has been less than ex-
press. Until the 1983 enactment of 4800.1 and 4800.2, the whole
area of statutory marital property presumptions in California had
been woefully underdeveloped. Both community property and
common law marital property presumptions, which had developed
the situation. See generally Mills, supra note 2; Reppy, Debt Collection, supra note 2;
Sterling, supra note 2, at 959-60, notes 239-40.
50. This presumption may be overcome by evidence of an agreement between the
spouses that the joint tenancy form of title has not transmuted the property from a commu-
nity character. Machado v. Machado, 58 Cal. 2d 501, 375 P.2d 55, 25 Cal. Rptr. 87
(1962); Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953)(tracing to separate prop-
erty source insufficient); Socol v. King, 36 Cal. 2d 342, 223 P.2d 627 (1950) (hidden or
undisclosed interest insufficient); Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905
(1944).
51. Sterling, supra note 2, at 958.
52. In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985);
In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980); Gudelj
v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953); Socol v. King, 36 Cal. 2d 342, 223 P.2d
627 (1950); Tomaier v, Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944); Estate of Blair, 199
Cal. App. 3d 199, 244 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988); Schindler v. Schindler, 126 Cal. App.2d 597,
272 P.2d 566 (1954); see Comment, Form of Title, supra note 2, at n. 7.
53. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
54. See Domestic Relations, supra note 6, at 121-24; Griffith, supra note 2, at 88-
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over the approximately 130 years that community property doc-
trine has been recognized in California, bore little relationship to
the framework of the California Evidence Code, particularly in
assigning the benefit of the presumption.56 Efforts at reform have
tended to create ad hoc rather than comprehensive solutions.
The situation in Estate of Blair is illustrative of the unpredict-
able results that can occur in a system of property ownership
which has made little provision for reconciling two such contradic-
tory interspousal estates as community property and joint tenancy.
It is important to understand how these two systems developed
concurrently and to note that despite approximately 140 years of
existence, there is still not a complete reconciliation of these es-
tates as they apply to characterizing marital property. As will be
seen in the following historical section, the commitment to a com-
munity property system has been anything but unequivocal with
the result that the California community property system still re-
tains much of the English common-law separate property system.
II. COMPARISON OF JOINT TENANCY AND COMMUNITY
PROPERTY
A. History of Joint Tenancy
Joint tenancy developed as a technical feudal estate founded on
the principle of the aggregation of landed estates in the hands of a
few, and opposed to their division among many persons.17 At com-
mon law, the creation of a joint tenancy required the "four uni-
ties": the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time and
the unity of possession; "or, in other words, joint tenants have one
and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance,
commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the
same undivided possession." 8
At common law, husband and wife could not hold property in
joint tenancy since they were considered as one person for the pur-
pose of the ownership of property. Rather, both were seized of the
56. See supra note 27. Although cases frequently assign the benefit of the commu-
nity property presumption to the community property proponent leaving the burden of re-
buttal to the separate property proponent (See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51
Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966); Estate of Niccolls, 164 Cal. 368, 129 P. 278 (1912); In re Marriage
of Lusk at 234, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 67-68), it is often both unclear how the court decides
which of the parties will have the benefit of the time presumption and what facts must first
be proved in order to give rise to the presumption. See supra notes 28-31 and accompany-
ing text.
57. Sterling, supra note 2, at 929-30; see generally Spitzer, supra note 25 for an
excellent discussion of the evolution of the joint tenancy estate; see also Inst. on Estate
Planning §§ 600-603 (1982).
58. Sterling, supra note 2, at 930.
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entirety, which gave rise to the common law tenancy by the en-
tireties.59 Although tenancy by the entireties encompasses the
same right of survivorship as joint tenancy, the crucial difference
is that as tenants by the entirety, neither tenant may sever the
tenancy during the lifetime of both since each is deemed to hold
an undivided right to the whole.60 In a joint tenancy situation,
each joint tenant is deemed to own his or her undivided interest
and as such, could sever the joint tenancy during the lifetime of
the joint tenants.
In California, tenancy by the entireties has never existed. Its
function has been subsumed by the adoption of a community
property system wherein a married woman could hold property
and contract.6 1 However, as early as 1872, the legislature recog-
nized the right of a husband and wife to hold title to assets in
joint tenancy as well as tenants in common and in community
property. 2
As has been noted by at least one commentator, California's
treatment of joint tenancies has had a long and tortuous history.
63
The early cases dealing with spousal joint tenancies held that as
between spouses, "a community estate and a joint tenancy cannot
exist at the same time in the same property." 64 The reasoning be-
hind such a decision is that while joint tenancy is a form of sepa-
rate property ownership wherein the parties may unilaterally con-
vey, encumber and otherwise deal with the property interest
limited only by the right of survivorship, the rights of spouses in
community property are "present, existing and equal" and do not
amount to an effective one-half interest except at dissolution and
59. Id. at 930-31, where the author notes the difference between joint tenancies
wherein each tenant has a right to an undivided one-half interest, and tenancies by the
entirety wherein each spouse is said to hold an undivided right to the whole. An indisputa-
ble right of each joint tenant is the power to convey his or her separate estate of way of gift
or otherwise. Riddle v. Harmon at 527, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 531 (citing the rule articulated
by the California Supreme Court in Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 23, 26, 13 P.2d 513, 514
(1932)). See Fetters, supra note 40, at n. 1 (Although some commentators have noted that
in at least 22 jurisdictions which recognize tenancy by the entireties husband and wife may
not take title as joint tenants, the author finds both direct and indirect evidence to the
contrary.)
60. Sterling, supra note 2, at 930-31.
61. But see sec. IIA discussing the evolution of the California community property
system toward a male-dominated model rather than system of property ownership and
management.
62. Cal. Civ. Code § 683 (West Supp. 1989) (enacted in 1872 and specifically recog-
nizing the right of husband and wife to hold title as joint tenants).
63. Blumberg, supra note 12, at 157; accord Sterling, supra note 2, at notes 3-6 and
accompanying text.
64. Siberell v. Siberell at 773, 7 P.2d at 1005 (1932). In Siberell, the supreme court
prophetically noted that concurrent operation of a common law system and community
property law system means that ". . . at times there will appear to be difficulty in harmo-
nizing these systems." Id. at 214 Cal. 771, 7 P.2d 1004.
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death. 5 In the leading case in this area, the court held that "use
of community funds to purchase the property and the taking of
title thereto in the name of the spouses as joint tenants is tanta-
mount to a binding agreement between them that the same shall
not thereafter be held as community property but instead as a
joint tenancy with all the characteristics of such an estate."66
Later cases established the rule that such presumptions could
be rebutted by a showing that husband and wife who take prop-
erty as joint tenants actually intend it to be community property.
Such parol evidence could be in the form of an oral or written
agreement.6 7 Although there was some disagreement among the
courts about what was sufficient to constitute agreement between
the spouses, it was clear that the mere fact that the joint tenancy
property was purchased with community property funds in itself
was not sufficient to rebut the joint tenancy form of title presump-
tion. 68 The policy consideration for such a requirement is to pro-
vide a fair and equitable result to spouses who in taking title to
marital property in joint form expect that they will share the re-
sulting appreciation equally. Without an understanding or agree-
ment, marital dissolution might be the first opportunity for the
noncontributing spouse to discover the unequal distribution of the
asset. At that point, it is too late to remedy the situation.69
B. Development of California Community Property
California community property law, which is patterned on the
Spanish ganancial system, establishes two categories of marital
property: community property and separate property.70 Commu-
nity property is all property acquired from the labors of either
spouse during the marriage." Separate property is defined as
property acquired prior to marriage by any means, and all prop-
erty acquired gratuitously during marriage, that is, by gift, devise,
65. Cal. Civ. Code § 5105 (West 1983).
66. Siberell v. Siberell at 773, 7 P.2d at 1005.
67. See Mills, supra note 2, at 43-44 for the kind of parol evidence sufficient to rebut
the joint tenancy form of title presumption. See also Sterling, supra note 2, at 958-59
(Siberell initially laid down the joint tenancy form of title rule as almost a conclusive
presumption of an agreement between the spouses as to the character of the property.).
68. Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953).
69. Form of Title, supra note 2, at 101-02. But question what the noncontributing
spouse might have done to insure equality at the time of the acquisition of the property. It
is certainly possible that he or she might have insisted on securing a loan rather than
making use of the separate property contribution, but such a possibility is not always eco-
nomically feasible.
70. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103 (1849-50) Cal. Stat. 254-55.
71. Cal. Civ. Code § 5110 (West Supp. 1989); see supra note 23 and accompanying
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or inheritance. 2
The unique feature of this system is that each spouse is said to
have contributed equally to the acquisition of the property regard-
less of the actual division of labor. Such a system inherently rec-
ognizes the existence of the community as a partnership with re-
spect to property rights of the spouses.73 Property which has the
character of community property is not severable during the mar-
riage of the spouses since each spouse is deemed to have a vested
one-half interest in the whole at the time that the property is ac-
quired. The community property estate differs from both the joint
tenancy estate and tenancy by the entirety in that there is no right
of survivorship.74
Although California community property is not severable uni-
laterally during marriage, 5 such property is freely alienable by
each spouse at his or her death.7 6 Each spouse is free to leave his
72. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5107 and 5108 (West Supp. 1989).
73. Prager, supra note 36, at 6; See generally, Prager, Sharing Principles and the
Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1977); Comment, Sharing Princi-
ples, supra note 25; Oldham, supra note 25; Glendon, supra note 25. The drafters of the
Uniform Marital Property Act also recognized marriage as a partnership with respect to
property rights. The Prefatory Note that precedes the official text of the Uniform Marital
Property Act speaks to the root concepts of the Act. "Rather than an evanescent hope, the
idea of sharing implicit in viewing property as 'ours' becomes reality as a result to a pre-
sent, vested ownership right which each spouse has in all property acquired by the personal
efforts of either during the marriage." Uniform Marital Property Act (ULA) Prefatory
Note (1987).
74. But see sources cited supra note 2 for the proposition that a hybrid es-
tate--community property with a right of survivorship--has existed indirectly in California
beginning in 1934 when the California Supreme Court ruled in Siberell that community
property could be transmuted to joint tenancy by form-of-title, but only if the spouses so
intended.
75. But see Fetters, supra note 40 for the proposition that unilateral severance of
joint tenancies can be used to perpetrate fraud on the other joint tenant; accord, Burke v.
Stevens, 264 Cal. App.2d 30, 264 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1968); Recommendation Relating to Re-
cording Severance of Joint Tenancy, 18 Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Reports 249 (1986)
(requiring that a severance of a real property joint tenancy be recorded prior to the death
of that joint tenancy in order to be effective to destroy the right of survivorship in the non-
severing joint tenant). The problems of unilateral severance are further exacerbated if the
property at issue is community property held in joint tenancy form. In order to prevent or
void the severance, the community property proponent has the burden of proving that the
property at issue was community rather than separate property. In a non-dissolution situa-
tion it seems that a Lucas agreement will be required. See also HoroBooNI & KING, supra
note 11, at §§ 8:163-8:163.3 for cases which hold that transfers in contravention of Cal.
Civ. Code § 5127 (West Supp. 1989) are voidable during marriage only as to the noncon-
senting spouse's one-half interest thereby permitting a severance of the community
property.
76. Contrast this incident of free alienability at death with the joint tenancy right of
survivorship which many commentators agree is the main reason why most married couples
tend to take title to marital property in joint tenancy form. As has been noted in note 75
supra, the survivorship incident can be defeated by the intervivos right to unilaterally sever
the joint tenancy. For comments regarding the necessity of probate and the rights of dece-
dent spouse's creditors to marital property, see infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
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or her one-half interest in the community property to whomever
he or she chooses." Since, at the death of the first spouse to die,
the community itself is deemed over, the concept of unilateral ina-
lienability of community property is also terminated. Although
more commonly the deceased spouse elects to leave his or her in-
terest in the community property to the surviving spouse, it is pos-
sible that the surviving spouse will hold title to former marital
property as a tenant in common with a stranger. While this pecu-
liar result does not seem to comport with the underlying concept
of the community, it is in strict compliance with the concept that
during lifetime each spouse is deemed to be indefeasibly vested
with a one-half interest in any marital property.
In spite of the intent of the 1849 Constitutional Convention to
adopt the Spanish system wholesale, the marital property provi-
sion of the California constitution appeared to address itself pri-
marily to the married woman's right to separate property. 8 In
that respect, some of the convention's delegates likened the provi-
sions to other married women's property acts which were then
coming into favor in the United States guaranteeing women the
right to own property and enter into contracts. 9
Although the implementing legislation8" initially created a sys-
tem of both separate and community property, certain provisions
in the statutes severely undercut the "vested property" nature of
the marital property system. For example, the 1850 Legislature
almost immediately severely restricted the wife's newly-acquired
property rights by according to the husband the exclusive right to
manage and control not only the community property but also his
wife's separate property. The husband's control was qualified only
negatively by giving the wife the right to curtail her husband's
exclusive control but not giving her the ability to make affirmative
decisions regarding the property herself.81 The overall effect of the
1850 legislation was to create a community property system in
name and a separate property system in effect. The husband was
soon seen as the full and complete owner of the community prop-
erty. Stephen Field, then a California Supreme Court Justice,
characterized the wife's interest as a "mere expectancy," a label
which was to linger for over 60 years.82
77, If the first spouse to die is intestate, 100% of his or her community property
passes to the surviving spouse. Cal. Prob. Code § 6401(a) (West Supp. 1989).
78. Prager, supra note 36, at 21.
79. Id. at 22.
80. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103 [1849-50] Cal. Stat. 254-55.
81. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 6, [1849-50] Cal. Stat. 254; Prager, supra note
36, at 26.
82. Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860),followed in Packard v. Arel-
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The original concept of community property, as envisioned in
the Spanish system and originally adopted by the 1859 conven-
tion, inured to all property acquired by earnings during mar-
riage.8" However, the scope of the separate property system inher-
ent in California's community property system was broadened
considerably by the California Supreme Court decision in George
v. Ransom. 4 The George court reversed prior law regarding the
community property character of all earnings and held that "the
Legislature has not the constitutional power to say that the fruits
of the property of the wife shall be taken from her, and given to
the husband or his creditors."85 The court explained its holding by
stating that the purpose of the constitutional provision protecting
the wife's separate property would be nullified if husband or his
creditors were permitted to benefit from the use of such property.
Although the court in George v. Ransom stated a feminist pur-
pose, the consensus among the commentators seems to be that
women would have fared better financially by a contrary decision
in George.88 The Supreme Court of Texas reached the opposite
result in Arnold v. Leonard, a case construing a Texas statute
holding that income from a spouse's separate property retained its
character as separate property. 7 This difference in outcome may
have been due to the sixty-five year time span between the two
decisions. George was decided during the heyday of the Married
Women's Property Acts which swept the country during the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century and was influenced by its common
law concepts which are incompatible with community property
principles.88
Eventually, the California legislature and courts began to recog-
nize the wife's rights, if not in the community property, then in
her separate property.8 9 This movement slowly eroded a system
which purported to give equal rights to spouses in marital prop-
erty but which in truth gave the husband almost unfettered rights
not only in the community property but also in his wife's separate
lanes, 17 Cal. 525, 539-40 (1861).
83. Bruch, California Marital Property, supra note 2, at 780, n. 48.
84. 15 Cal. 322 (1860). The holding in George is codified at Cal. Civ. Code 5107
and 5108.
85. Id. at 32.
86. REPPY, supra note 34, at 17.
87. 114 Tex. 535 (1925); ironically, Arnold held unconstitutional a Texas statute
that defined as separate property the fruits of separate property. Ch. 194, [1917] Tex.
Laws.
88. Bodenheiner, The Community Without Community Property: The Need for
Legislative Attention to Separate-Property Marriages Under Community Property Law, 8
CAL W.L. REV. 381, 384, (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer].
89. Prager, supra note 36, at 39.
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property, The adoption of the civil code in 1872 finally accom-
plished the 1849 convention's avowed purpose of guaranteeing
ownership of separate property to married women.9 0 In addition to
giving to women the management of their own property, in 1866 a
statute was enacted which gave to a woman the right to freely
transfer her property at death without the consent of her
husband.9'
Despite a diminution of the husband's exclusive management of
the community property, the California Supreme Court continued
to reinforce the doctrine that a married woman had no greater
than an inchoate right in the community property which the court
continued to refer to as a "mere expectancy." Only if wife sur-
vived her husband did she receive a one-half interest in the com-
munity property, not as her vested interest, but comparable to a
forced share in common law states. 2 If husband survived, wife's
interest in the community, which had never ripened into a vested
property right, simply disappeared.
Explicit legislation, in the form of statutory amendments, was
required to finally recognize wife's interest in the community as
one fully vested from the moment of acquisition of the property.
3
A major impetus for this legislative recognition was the adoption
of a federal income tax in 1913.1" The effects of this progressive
tax could be ameliorated by splitting a married couple's income
into husband's and wife's. As this was permissible only if state law
recognized a vested right in the property in each spouse,95 such
income-splitting gave California the motivation to recognize wife's
vested interest in the community property. In 1927, the California
90. Id. at 40.
91. While these legislative changes were occurring with respect to a married wo-
man's separate property, her interest in the common or community property was still con-
sidered an expectancy as articulated in Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228
(1897) and progeny. See Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Prop-
erty Reforms, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1060-70 (1975). [hereinafter Reppy, Retroactivity].
92. See Reppy, Retroactivity, supra note 91, at 1059-86 for a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's holdings in Spreckels and its progeny that husband was the complete owner
of all community property and wife's interest was in the nature of a forced heir; Prager,
supra note 36, at 47.
93. The first amendment, enacted in 1923, gave wife testamentary power over her
one-half of the community. Act of April 16, 1923, ch. 19, [1923] Cal. Stat. 29. In 1927,
the Legislature declared that the spouses' interests in the community property were "pre-
sent, existing and equal" interests subject to the management of the husband. Act of April
28, 1927, ch. 265 § 1, [1927] Cal. Stat. 484.
94. See Reppy, Retroactivity, supra note 91, at 1086.
95. In 1921 an opinion of the United States Attorney General to the Secretary of the
Treasury declared that splitting of community income by spouses in all community prop-
erty states except California was permissible since only California failed to recognize hus-
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legislature finally enacted Civil Code 161 giving wife co-equal
ownership with husband of all community property. 98
Since 1975, the general management rule in California has
given each spouse the power to manage and control both that
spouse's separate property and the community property.9" Under
the California combination of unilateral management and joint
control of community property, personal property may be man-
aged by each spouse acting alone."8 The same is true of real prop-
erty with certain restrictions requiring the consent of both spouses
for major actions such as transferring, encumbering and leasing
for more than one year.99 With the enactment of joint and equal
management rules 00 which did not follow earnings, the California
community property system was infused with new life. A spouse
who may not have contributed to the acquisition in any direct
sense now had decision-making power and could bind the
community.' 0
In 1965, at the urging of various commentators, the legislature
added a community property presumption for a single-family resi-
dence held in joint tenancy, creating for the first time a new hy-
brid estate for marital property-community property with a right
96. Cal. Civ. Code § 161a stated:
The respective interest of husband and wife in community property during contin-
uance of the marriage relation are present, existing and equal interests under the
management and control of the husband as is provided in sections 172 and 172a of
the Civil Code. This section shall be construed as defining the respective interest
and rights of husband and wife in community property.
But see Prager, supra note 36, at 63, note 318 for comments on the significance of 162
beyond its tax significance.
97. 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 987, §§ 14, 15 (amended Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5125, 5127
(West 1970), current version at id. §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1989).
98. Cal. Civ. Code § 5125 (West Supp. 1989). Section 5125 gives either spouse the
right to management and control of the community personal property with certain excep-
tions. This unilateral and co-equal right is subject to the § 5125(e) duty of interspousal
good faith. Hogoboom and King point out that because the duty of good faith is that
imposed on those in confidential relationships as opposed to Cal. Prob. Code section 15000
highest good faith standard governing the actions of trustees, inquire whether the Legisla-
ture intended to forgive minor breaches of the duty. Id., supra note 12, at § 8:150.2.
99. Cal. Civ. Code § 5125 (West Supp. 1989).
100. Notwithstanding this joint and equal system, there are still carved out excep-
tions to the equal management rule that are carryovers from the essentially separate prop-
erty system that existed in California for more than a century. For example, because of
concerns for certainty in banking transactions, a spouse who banks earnings in an account
held solely in his or her name only need not be concerned that the other spouse will have
access to those funds. In order to have access to such an account, a dissolution order is
often required in order to establish the rights of the parties in the community property and
to give the non-earning spouse relief from mismanagement. Sole management is also dic-
tated for a community property business, allegedly to give the business spouse full auton-
omy over the running of the business. Notwithstanding the § 5125(d) business exception, §
5110.120 would appear to intrude on the business spouse's autonomy by subjecting the
community business property to the nonbusiness spouse's creditors.
101. Prager, supra note 36, at 79.
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of survivorship. In so doing, the legislature expressly articulated
its position in favor of a community rather than a separate prop-
erty characterization for marital property. Since 1965, the legisla-
ture has substantially strengthened its position in favor of finding
property to be community rather than separate by enacting Civil
Code sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 in 1983.102
Before exploring the impact of these recent change in marital
property characterization on current California law, it is impor-
tant to explore in some depth the prevailing evidentiary presump-
tions regarding the characterization of such property. It is equally
important and, as we shall see difficult, to put these presumptions
in their proper context in the framework of the California Evi-
dence Code.
III. THE ROLE OF PRESUMPTIONS IN THE CALIFORNIA
COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
A. Defining Presumptions under the California Evidence Code
Historically, presumptions have played an important role in de-
fining the character of marital property as community or separate.
A presumption is defined as a standardized practice under which
certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to
their effect as proof of other facts.103 In other words, the party
who has the benefit of the presumption has satisfied his or her
burden of producing evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie
case. Most legal scholars agree that the effect of a presumption
not only satisfies that party's burden of producing evidence, but
also shifts the burden to the opposing party. 04 If the presumption
in question is a rebuttable one, the introduction of a presumption
102. As noted earlier, California's statutory community property presumptions for
jointly-held property impliedly create a new estate-community property with a right of
survivorship--without expressly so stating. It is this author's contention that many of the
difficulties in the area of marital property characterization that have arisen and will con-
tinue to arise are directly due to the legislature's failure of accountability. The situation
will be further aggravated by the fact that California domiciliaries are presumed to have
knowledge of this "secret" hybrid estate of which they have no notice whatsoever. Compare
Uniform Marital Property Act § I I (e) specifically recognizing "survivorship marital prop-
erty." See also Mennell, supra note 2, at 792-800.
103. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 965 (3d ed. 1984). For example, a common presump-
tion dictates a presumed conclusion that a letter was properly received if the party assert-
ing the claim can prove the basic facts that the letter was properly addressed and mailed.
The advantage of the presumption is that the moving party need not actually prove either
directly or circumstantially that the letter was received.
104. As Dean McCormick states, "prima facie" case is an ambiguous term which
can mean as little as sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict or it may mean as
much as evidence sufficient to shift the burden of producing evidence. McCormick takes
the former position and finds the latter position to be the effect of a presumption. See
McCormick, supra note 103, at 965.
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will have one of two effects: either the presumption will affect the
burden of producing evidence'0 5 or it will affect the burden of
proof or persuasion."0 6
There are two dominant views regarding the general effect of
presumptions. The majority view associated with Professor James
Bradley Thayer, a 19th century evidence scholar, 0 7 holds that the
only procedural effect of presumption is to shift the burden of pro-
ducing evidence to the opposing party. 0 8 A presumption that af-
fects the burden of producing evidence is "established to imple-
ment no public policy other than to facilitate the determination of
the particular action in which the presumption is applied.'
0 9
These presumptions are not based on any public policy extrinsic to
the action in which they are invoked. They merely reflect a judi-
cial determination that the same conclusionary fact exists so fre-
quently when the preliminary fact exists that, once the prelimi-
nary fact is established, proof of the conclusionary fact may be
disposed with unless there is actually contrary evidence."'
A growing minority of states have adopted the so-called Mor-
gan-view"' which holds that the procedural effect of a presump-
tion is to shift the burden of persuasion or proof. A presumption
that affects the burden of proof is one that is established to imple-
ment some public policy other than simply to facilitate the deter-
mination of the particular action in which the presumption is ap-
plied. It places great weight both on the probative link between
basic and presumed facts and on the supposed ability of presump-
105. The party who has the burden of producing evidence must present evidence
sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, i.e. evidence when viewed in a manner most
favorable to the moving party is at least adequate to permit a reasonable jury to find that
the existence of the essential elements of the claim is more probable than their nonexis-
tence. LILLY, EVIDENCE 48 (2nd. ed. 1987) [hereinafter LILLY]. This burden is usually cast
first on the party who has plead the existence of a fact who in most cases is the plaintiff
trying to make out a prima facie case. Query in a typical case where the character of
marital property is at issue who is the plaintiff and who is the defendant for purposes of
deciding which party should be assigned the burden of producing evidence. The burden of
producing evidence can shift to the opposing party when the moving party has satisfied his
or her burden. Id. at 47-48; McCormick, supra note 103, at 947.
106. The party who is allocated the burden of proof or persuasion must persuade the
trier of fact of the existence of the elements of his claim according to a standard or degree
of certainty mandated by the type of proceeding; in a typical civil case, a party must prove
the elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence or by "clear and convincing"
proof. LILLY, supra note 105, at 48.
107. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) [hereinafter THAYER].
108. Id. at 59. As Professor Lilly points, the effect of a presumption may be nullified
by proving the nondxistence of the basic facts.
109. Cal. Evid. Code. § 603 (Deering 1986).
110. THAYER, supra note 107, at 326.
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tions in advancing desirable social policy."' These presumptions
require a finding of the presumed fact not only when there is no
contrary evidence but also when the mind of the trier of fact is in
equilibrium or when the trier of fact does not believe the contrary
evidence.
Traditionally, neither the California Evidence nor Civil Codes
have spoken to or classified community property presumptions."'
Therefore, the courts are left with little guidance as to how to
apply the presumptions even to the extent of knowing which party,
the community or separate property proponent, has the benefit of
the presumption." 4 In the following sections the more common
presumptions which arise in marital property characterization sit-
uations are discussed.
B. Community Property Presumptions
California Civil Code section 5110 (formally section 164) de-
fines community property as all real property located in California
and all personal property wherever located acquired by a married
person while domiciled in California. Nowhere does the language
of this statute expressly create an evidentiary presumption; 5110
simply articulates the elements which must be present in order
that certain marital property be characterized as community
rather than separate." 5
The legislature and the judiciary have repeatedly articulated a
policy of advancing the California community property system
through the use of presumptions favoring the community estate."'
112. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 74-81 (1956); Professor Morgan ad-
vanced this theory of the effect of a presumption as a universal one, i.e., applicable to all
presumptions. The California Evidence Code has adopted both the Thayer theory of pre-
sumptions (Id. at § 603) and the Morgan view of presumptions (at Id. § 605) (Deering
1986); See also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
113. As noted in at least one case, statutorily § 5110, commonly known as the "gen-
eral community property" presumption, does not mandate a presumption but only provides
a definition of community property by negative implication. See supra note 27. See, how-
ever, supra note 4 wherein section 4800.1 is specifically defined as a presumption affecting
the burden of proof. See also 17 Comm'n Rpts, supra note 42, at 220-23 for proposed
legislation defining community property presumptions, their evidentiary effect and the stan-
dards required for rebuttal.
114. Under section 4 of UMPA, all property of spouses is presumed to be marital
property. The Comment to this section states that the bias of the general presumption
favors classifying spousal assets as marital property and only when there is adequate proof
to overcome the presumption will the classification be otherwise.
115. Since 5110 does not expressly create a presumption, it has been the function of
the courts to both mandate the presumption, its evidentiary effect and the standard for
rebuttal.
116. Recommendation Relating to Civil Code Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2, 18 Cal.
L. Revision Comm'n Reports 383, 389 at No 10 (1986) [hereinafter Recommendation on
4800.1 and 4800.2]; Wilson v. Wilson, 76 Cal. App.2d 119, 172 P.2d 568 (1946);
[Vol. 26
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Since the statute defining community property does not expressly
create such a presumption, finding a pro-community property pre-
sumption to exist in the language of 5110 has been a matter of
judicial decision. The first California cases to interpret the 1850
statute117 as creating a presumption in favor of community prop-
erty for all property acquired during the existence of the commu-
nity were Smith v. Smith""8 and Meyer v. Kinzer.119 Justice Field,
speaking for the court in both cases, stated the rule that all prop-
erty in the possession of either spouse during the existence of the
community is presumed to be community property and such pre-
sumption "can be overcome by clear and certain proof that it was
owned by the claimant before marriage or acquired afterwards in
one of the particular ways specified in the statute... "120 Despite
Justice Field's otherwise harsh interpretation of community prop-
erty systems,12' these early cases made the community property
presumption readily available to the pro-community spouse who
had to prove only possession during marriage to shift the burden
of proof to the separate property proponent.1 22 Even these early
cases, however, presumed the initial claimant to be the community
property proponent who was required to make out a prima facie
case in favor of a community property characterization.12
As the system developed, the basic facts which had to be proved
in order to have the advantage of the presumption have not always
been so clear. The three basic approaches124 taken by the courts in
assigning the presumption present substantially different proof re-
quirements to the party attempting to claim the benefit of the pre-
sumption. In approximately 90 % of the reported cases, the com-
munity property presumption is not available until the claimant
has proved that the property at issue was acquired during the
marriage. 25 Since it is often very difficult to prove time of acquisi-
tion, such a policy seems to be inapposite to the underlying policy
of the 5110 presumption: to favor a community rather than a sep-
arate property characterization for marital property. The follow-
Ashodian v. Ashodian, 96 Cal. App. 3d 43, 157 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1979).
117. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, [1849-50] Cal. Stat. 254-55.
118. 12 Cal. 216 (1859).
119. 12 Cal. 247 (1859).
120. Id. at 253.
121. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
122. Meyer v. Kinzer at 253-54. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
123. From the perspective of promoting a policy which favors the characterization of
marital property as community whenever possible, it makes most sense to assign to the
separate property proponent the burden of establishing that the property in question is
separate. If such spouse cannot so establish, the property is characterized as community.
124. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
125. See REPPY, supra note 34, at 64.
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ing case exemplifies such an approach.
In Fidelity & Casualty Company v. Mahoney,126 husband pur-
chased an airplane-travel accident insurance policy for $1 naming
his son as beneficiary of the policy. Husband's airplane crashed
and he was killed. His wife of two months claimed one-half of the
proceeds of policy as her community property interest in an asset
acquired during marriage while domiciled in California, the insur-
ance policy. The court refused to grant her the benefit of the gen-
eral community property presumption as to the insurance policy
unless she was able to prove that the one dollar used to purchase
the policy was community property. Since she was unable to prove
the time of acquisition of the one dollar, the separate property
proponent, husband's son, prevailed.
Mahoney raises a number of issues regarding the role of pre-
sumptions in the characterization of marital property. First, while
recognizing that the function of the general community property
presumptions is to reflect the probability that most property ac-
quired during marriage is community,127 the court insisted that
the presumption attach only in cases of marriages of long dura-
tion. "Where the marriage relation has existed a short period of
time the presumption that property acquired after marriage is
community property is of less weight than in the case of a long
continued relationship." ' s
Second, by insisting that wife prove each and every element of
the community property definition in order to prevail,129 the court
effectively assigned to her the burden of proving the community
character of the property without the benefit of any presump-
tion. °30 To accord to her the presumption only after she proves
each element gives her no benefit and is logically inconsistent. Ef-
fectively, the court in Mahoney assigned the role of plaintiff to the
wife who then had the burden of proof as to each fact the exis-
tence or nonexistence of which was essential to her claim for re-
lief. 3 ' Had the Mahoney court instead allocated the burden of
proving that the insurance policy was separate to the son, he too
would have failed to make out a prima facie case and wife would
126. 71 Cal. App.2d 65, 161 P.2d 944 (1945).
127. Accord. Recommendation on 4800.1 and 4800.2, supra note 116.
128. Fidelity & Casualty Company v. Mahoney at 68, 161 P.2d at 946; accord. Es-
tate of Duncan at 217, 70 P.2d at 179; Falk v. Falk at 762, 767, 120 P.2d at 717.
129. The court stated that although a presumption exists that all property acquired
during marriage is community property, "[tihere is no presumption, however, as to when
property was acquired." Id. at 68, 161 P.2d at 944.
130. One might inquire why the court's focus was the time of acquisition of the $1
consideration rather than the time of acquisition of the asset in question, the insurance
policy.
131. Cal. Evid. Code § 500 (Deering 1986).
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have prevailed by default.
The Mahoney court did not attempt to justify its position vis-a-
vis a pro-community public policy.13 2 If anything, the court
seemed more anxious to promote a policy in favor of finding the
property of short marriages to be separate. While the result in
Mahoney may have been sound, the case does not provide many
guidelines for the allocation of the presumption.
In light of the foregoing discussion about the inconsistencies
among the courts in assigning the burden of proof in community
property inter se disputes, it seems somewhat paradoxical that the
1965 addition to Cal. Civ. Code section 164 and the 1983 version
of Cal. Civ. Code section 4800.1 create a presumption in favor of
community property which requires no more proof of basic facts
than the existence of an interspousal joint tenancy. There seems to
be some logical inconsistency in affording the benefit of the com-
munity property presumption to an otherwise separate property
estate based merely on form of title while requiring proof of time
of acquisition in other situations where the character of marital
property is at issue.133
The type of community property presumption, "time of acquisi-
tion '' 134 or "form of title"'3 5 dictates the type of evidence required
to successfully rebut the presumption. It has long been the law in
California that form of title may be overcome by parol evidence
showing a common interspousal understanding or agreement that
132. Compare the results in cases where "possession" during marriage equals "ac-
quisition." Lyman v. Vorwerk at 509, 110 P. at 355.
133. California community property cases have found the presumptions mandated by
5110 to be presumptions affecting the burden of proof rather than the burden of producing
evidence. Baron v. Baron, 9 Cal. App. 3d 933, 88 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1970); Hansford v.
Lassar, 53 Cal. App. 3d 364, 125 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1975); Ashodian v. Ashodian, 96 Cal.
App. 3d 43, 157 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1979).
Because the thrust of 4800.1 is to apply the community property presumptions to situa-
tions where spouses have taken title to community property in joint tenancy form, it is
particularly paradoxical that the first four cases interpreting the 4800.1 community prop-
erty presumption were all situations where the property at issue had been the separate
property of one of the spouses that had been transmuted to joint tenancy-community prop-
erty during the marriage. In re Marriage of Martinez, 156 Cal. App. 3d 20, 202 Cal. Rptr.
646 (1984); In re Marriage of Anderson, 154 Cal. App. 3d 572, 201 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1984);
In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1984); In re Marriage
of Buol, 15 Cal. App. 3d 174 (1984), rev'd 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr.
31 (1985).
134. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 47. A form of title presumption does not arise when the title to
property is taken in the nameof one of the spouses alone. This form of title will not defeat
or supersede the general community property presumption. The general presumption may
be overcome by the separate property proponent by tracing the asset to a separate property
source. Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App.2d 144, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1962); In re Marriage of
Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975). See also, de Funiak and
Vaughn, Principles of Community Property 199-120 (2nd. ed. 1971).
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the character of property is other than expressed by title.1 36 The
threshold issue in this form of rebuttal is whether the understand-
ing as to the character or transmutation of character is a mutual
one 137. If the community property presumption arises because of
time of acquisition' 38, then the proof required for overcoming the
presumption is less onerous and may be accomplished by the sepa-
rate property proponent by mere tracing to a separate property
source.1
39
C. Joint Tenancy Presumption
Until amended by statute in 1965,140 the "form of title" or com-
mon law presumption controlled the character of marital property.
The specific act of taking title in joint tenancy affirmatively trans-
mutated the character of the property by mutual agreement not-
withstanding the character of the property used to acquire the
joint tenancy property.
This rule, first articulated in the now famous case, Siberell v.
Siberell, stated:
First, from the very nature of the estate, as between husband
and wife, a community estate and a joint tenancy cannot exist at
the same time in the same property. The use of community
funds to purchase the property and the taking of title thereto in
136. Tomaier v. Tomaier at 759, 146 P.2d at 907; In re Marriage of Lucas at 815,
614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857; see Mills, supra note 2 at 43; Comment, Form of
Title, supra note 2, at 97; Hogoboom & King, supra note 11, at §§ 8:9-8:37. The language
of these cases calls for an agreement in order to rebut form of title because of the affirma-
tive act of designating ownership. It seems more consistent to say that the reason for re-
quiring an agreement is not really to rebut form of title but to effect a transmutation from
character as expressed in title to that otherwise agreed to by the parties.
137. The mutuality requirement certainly seems to bolster the argument in the pre-
ceding footnote that what the court is really looking for vis-a-vis the agreement is a
transmutation.
138. The time of acquisition or general community property presumption of Cal. Civ.
Code section 5110 attaches when two conditions are met: (1) the property was acquired
during the marriage; and (2) there is no contradictory form of title or common law pre-
sumption. In such cases tracing is sufficient to overcome the presumption because there has
been no transmutation by agreement from community property as with form of title.
139. In Lucas, the supreme court, citing their earlier decision in Socol v. King, 36
Cal. 2d 342, 223 P.2d 627 (1950), specifically stated that it was the affirmative act of
specifying a form of ownership in the conveyance of title that removes such property from
the more general presumption of 5110. The court in Socol reiterated the rule that to rebut
joint tenancy form of title, a showing of a common understanding or agreement is neces-
sary; mere tracing is insufficient. From the time that Siberell was decided, knowledge of
the consequences of marital property characterization has been imputed to spouses. Intent
of the spouses at the time of the transaction, although relevant to disprove form of title, has
never been informed intent. In re Marriage of Lucas at 815, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal.
Rptr. at 857; Estate of Murphy, 15 Cal. 3d 907, 917-19, 544 P.2d 956, 963-65, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 827-29 (1976); See v. See at 783, 415 P.2d at 779-80, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 891-92
(1966).
140. Cal. Civ. Code § 164 amended by 1965 Cal. Stats. c. 1710, p. 3843, § 1.
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the name of the spouses as joint tenants is tantamount to a
binding agreement between them that the same shall not there-
after be held as community property but instead as a joint ten-
ancy with all the characteristics of such an estate. 14 (emphasis
added)
The inflexible rule of Siberell has been modified over the years by
cases which recognize that although form of title creates a pre-
sumption of transmutation from community property to joint ten-
ancy, "[t] hat form of conveyance .... raises the rebuttable pre-
sumption that the property is as described in the deed, and places
the burden on the party claiming the property to be community to
prove the fact. '142 Rebuttal requires demonstration of the exis-
tence of an mutual agreement between the parties contrary to
form of title.143 Such mutual agreement serves as a second trans-
mutation from the character of the property as indicated by title
to community property.1
4 4
According to the Lucas court, the policy underlying the require-
ment of an agreement to rebut form of title is a sound one. When
title to property to which one of the spouses has made a separate
property contribution is taken in joint form, the usual expectation
of the noncontributing spouse is that the contributing spouse does
not anticipate either reimbursement or pro rata apportionment of
any future appreciation. In other words, the spouse contributing
the separate property has made a gift to the community. If the
non-contributing spouse had an expectation that the separate
property contribution would be treated as buying into title, he or
she might have attempted to preserve the joint nature of the prop-
erty by making other financing arrangements such as securing a
loan to the community. This line of reasoning fails to recognize
that the reason for taking title in joint form may have very little
to do with the expectation of the parties and much more to do
with the advice of real estate agents or the desire to avoid a pro-
bate at the death of the first spouse to die.
141. Siberell v. Siberell at 773, 7 P.2d at 1005 (1932).
142. Edwards v. Dietrich, 118 Cal. App. 2d 254, 260, 257 P.2d 750, 754 (1953).
143. Schindler v. Schindler, 126 Cal. App. 2d 597, 272 P.2d 566 (1954); see gener-
ally Form of Title, supra note 2.
144. Query the necessity of finding a transmutation from community property to
joint tenancy simply because title was taken in joint tenancy (if the requisite intent to
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D. The Hybrid Estate Presumption4"
In 1965, the legislature, recognizing the widespread use of
spousal joint tenancies, articulated its perception of California's
fundamental public policy regarding jointly-held marital property.
The legislature recognized that traditionally the law has favored
the existence of a community property system under the manage-
ment of husband in which husband and wife each have a present,
existing and equal interest; that creditors of either husband or
wife may look to the community for satisfaction of debts; that
such a system provides the courts with the latitude to divide the
marital property unequally, when necessary; and that at the death
of the first spouse to die, in default of testamentary disposition,
the surviving spouse takes the deceased spouse's one-half of the
community property subject to the claims of creditors. 4"
Disapproving the result in cases like Siberell and Schindler, the
legislature added language to Civil Code 164 which imposed a re-
buttable presumption, applicable in dissolution cases only, that a
single-family residence held in joint tenancy is community prop-
erty. In 1969, the Family Law Act' 47 repealed section 164 and
incorporated an almost identical provision in section 5110. Since
section 5110 was silent on the type of proof necessary to rebut the
joint tenancy form of title presumption,' 48 the presumption could
be overcome by any traditional means. 49 While the adoption of
the community property presumption for single-family residences
satisfied the legislature's desire to negate the adverse effect of
spousal joint tenancies on the division of property at dissolution,
the ability to use parol evidence to rebut the 5110 single-family
principal residence presumption continued to present an unsatis-
factory situation. 50
In 1983, in order to reverse the effect of the Lucas court's reaf-
firmation of the use of parol evidence, the legislature enacted Cal.
145. The concept of this estate was first recognized and articulated by Yale Griffith
in his much-cited and widely-followed 1961 Stanford Law Review article. See Griffith,
supra note 2.
146. See Domestic Relations, supra note 6, at 121-24.
147. 1969 Cal. Stat., ch. 1608, sec. 8. at 3339 (enacting Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4800-
4812.)
148. The Lucas court, referencing the Final Report of the Assembly Interim Com-
mittee on Judiciary Relating to Domestic Relations, stated that "[t]here is no indication
that the Legislature intended in any way to change the rules regarding the strength and
type of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption arising from the form of title." In
re Marriage of Lucas at 813-14, 614 P.2d at 287-88, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (1980). See
supra note 11.
149. The Lucas court then went on to restate and reaffirm prior case law regarding
the form of title rebuttal standards. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
150. See Recommendation in 4800.1 and 4800.2, supra note 116 and accompanying
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Civ. Code section 4800.1 as part of Assembly Bill 26.1"1 While
4800.1 extended the reach of the 5110 single-family residence pre-
sumption to all property held by husband and wife in joint ten-
ancy form for the purpose of the division of marital property at
dissolution or legal separation, it more importantly abolished the
use of parol evidence for rebuttal purposes by creating a statute of
frauds rebuttal requirement. Spouses who take title to assets in
joint tenancy form would not be permitted to rebut the 4800.1
community property presumption without a written showing of
their intent to the contrary either on the deed or in a separate
writing. 152 The effect of the 4800.1 statute of frauds requirement
is to preserve a separate property pro rata interest in an asset
which is an admixture of both community and separate property
only if, at the time the property is acquired in joint tenancy form,
the parties also execute a written agreement to that effect. The
4800.1 writing requirement was made retroactive to all proceed-
ings commenced either on or after January 1, 1984, or before Jan-
uary 1, 1984, to the extent proceedings as to the division of prop-
erty were not yet final on January 1, 1984.153
The difficulty with 4800.1 is not with regards to its community
property presumption since it is merely an extension of the 5110
single-family residence to all interspousal property held in joint
title. It is the statute of frauds requirement and particularly its
retroactive application that has met with great resistance in the
courts. Whether the retroactive application of a stricter eviden-
tiary burden on the separate property proponent is constitutionally
defective because of a failure of due process is an issue which has
been addressed by the California Supreme Court only once. In
Marriage of Buol, 54 Justice Reynoso, speaking for the court,
stated:
Legislative intent ... is only one prerequisite to retroactive ap-
plication of a statute. Having identified such intent, it remains
151. Cal. Civ. Code § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1986). See 1983 Sen. Rept., supra note 7,
at 864.
152. In Recommendation on 4800.1 and 4800.2, supra note 116, note 10, the Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission states that "[tihe requirement of a writing is important
to help ensure that a party waives his or her community property rights only upon a ma-
ture consideration." Query what percentage of the lay public affected by the 4800.1 writing
requirement has even heard of it so that a spouse contributing separate property or con-
verting his or her separate property to joint tenancy for whatever reason is on notice of
such requirement. Such a spouse waives his or her separate property rights without benefit
of either notice or "mature consideration." Accord, supra note 148 and accompanying text.
153. Stats. 1983, ch. 342, § 4.
154. 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985). In Buol, a house
bought with funds which husband and wife had previously orally agreed were separate, was
placed in joint tenancy at the advice of a real estate agent. While the trial court's decision
was being appealed, the Legislature passed 4800.1.
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for us to determine whether retroactivity is barred by constitu-
tional constraints. We have long held that the retrospective ap-
plication of a statute may be unconstitutional if it is an ex post
facto law, if it deprives a person of a vested right without due
process of law .... 151
It is clear from the opinion in Buol that the Supreme Court found
the retroactive application of 4800.1 to have a substantive effect
on substantial and vested property rights of the separate property
contributor. From the legislature's perspective, however, the effect
of 4800.1 is merely evidentiary. One reason for the enactment of
4800.1 advanced by the legislature is to strengthen the community
property system and insure an equitable division of marital prop-
erty at dissolution.156 The community property presumption of
4800.1 gives statutory recognition to the well-documented fact
that much interspousal joint tenancy property is more often than
not community property.1 57 The legislature may also have desired
to alter spousal conduct by encouraging the spouses to memorial-
ize their property-related agreements in a writing.158
The final form of 4800.1 is substantially different from that ini-
tially proposed by the Law Revision Commission which resembled
much more closely a true division-at-divorce statute.15 The pro-
155. Id. at 756, 705 P.2d at 357, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34. The issue of retroactive
application of community property legislation was first addressed by the California Su-
preme Court in Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228, 231 (1897), which held
such retroactive application unconstitutional if its effects would be to impair vested prop-
erty rights. This was the state of the law vis-a-vis retroactivity until 1965 when the su-
preme court again addressed the issue on Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 339 P.2d
897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965) and held that the retroactive application of legislation could
impair vested property rights when a significant public purpose was served thereby. This
balancing test was continued by the court until its recent decisions on Buol and Fabian.
The doctrine that the court established in Buol and Fabian would permit retroactive appli-
cation to impair a vested property right only if the state interest rectifies a former rank
injustice. Id. at 39 Cal. 3d 761, 705 P.2d 360, 218 Cal. Rptr. 37. See Flagg, supra note 13,
at 15 for the proposition that the holdings in Buol and Fabian essentially preclude any
retroactive changes in community property law. Id. at 47. Compare the argument of Pro-
fessor Reppy in Reppy, Rankly Unjust I, supra note 13.
156. See 1983 Sen. Rept, supra note 7, at 863-64; Domestic Relations, supra note 6,
at 122-25; 16 Comm'n Rpts, supra note 7 at 2169-71; Recommendation on 4800.1 and
4800.2, supra note 116, at 387; In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 762, 705 P.2d 354,
361 218 Cal. Rptr. 31, 37 (1985).
157. See Domestic Relations, supra note 6, at 121-22; 16 Comm'n Rpts, supra note
7, at 2170; Griffith, supra note 2; Bruch, California Marital Property, supra note 2.
158. See, Reppy, Rankly Unjust II, supra note 13, at 3. While it is true that written
evidence of intent is inherently more reliable that parol evidence, it is still questionable
whether the statute of frauds requirement of 4800.1 and the written waiver of 4800.2 is
within the expectation of most parties who are without knowledge of its existence and
consequences. Even if the consequences of the statutory scheme are within the expectations
of most married couples, would not notice on deeds and other instruments of title make
these statutes both more reliable and more equitable.
159. A typical division-on-divorce statute either shuffles the parties' interests in mari-
tal property leaving them in the same relative positions as prior to dissolution; or it puts
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posed version neither created a community property presumption
nor altered the rebuttal standard; it simply extended the courts'
jurisdiction over marital property by granting them jurisdiction to
divide not only the community estate but also any jointly-titled
property of the spouses. For the purpose of the application of the
proposed version of 4800.1, the interests of the parties were pre-
sumed to be equal; this presumption could be overcome by proof
of an agreement between the parties to the contrary or by
tracing.600
It seems clear that if the supreme court had been presented
with such a statute, it would have had little difficulty applying it
to property and proceedings commenced prior to its enactment.
Such a statute has the effect of conceding the existence of the
separate property interest while at the same time recognizing the
equities which make it subject to division at dissolution. 161
This was not the situation that was presented to the court in
Buol. The statute of frauds requirement of 4800.1 had the effect
of "barring recognition of the vested separate property interest"
by retroactively imposing a condition on the separate property
spouse with which it was impossible to comply.'" 2 Even in a situa-
tion where the application of 4800.1 is not constitutionally defec-
tive, the writing requirement puts the separate property contribu-
tor in a position of having to secure a marital property agreement
with his or her spouse in order to to be entitled to share in the
appreciation of the asset. If securing such an agreement is not
possible for any reason, the contributing spouse is deemed to have
made an interest-free loan to the community.
In Marriage of Buol, Esther purchased a house with earnings
that husband and wife had orally agreed were her separate prop-
erty. She took title to the house in joint tenancy at the advice of
her real estate agent. Notwithstanding title, Esther received nu-
merous assurances from her husband that the house was her sepa-
rate property. At dissolution, the trial court found that the parties
had an agreement sufficient to rebut the 5110 community property
presumption and awarded the home to Esther. While the judge-
ment was pending appeal, the legislature enacted 4800.1.
In analyzing the retroactive applicability of the writing require-
ment of 4800.1 to cases pending before its effective date, the court
one spouse in a better position than he or she was in prior to the dissolution. California
quasi-community property statutes and equitable distribution laws enacted in separate
property states are such statutes. Id. at 2 & 8.
160. See supra notes 7 & 10. In this respect, proposed section 4800.1 most closely
resembles CAL. PROB. CODE § 5305.
161. See Reppy, Rankly Unjust, supra note 13, at 4; Flagg, supra note 13, at 40.
162. In re Marriage of Buol at 759, 705 P.2d at 359, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (1985).
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expressly disapproved previous holdings that the effect of such a
requirement was not substantive but merely evidentiary. The court
held that "[b]y eliminating the means by which one might prove
the existence of the vested property right, imposing instead an evi-
dentiary requirement with which it is impossible to comply, sec-
tion 4800.1 affects the vested property right itself...,,le In Cali-
fornia, property is characterized as separate or community
according to the law in effect at the time of acquisition. 6 At the
time of acquisition, the Buols fixed the character of the house as
Esther's separate property by entering into an oral agreement to
that effect. 165 At all relevant times thereafter, proof of a separate
agreement was all that was required to protect Esther's vested
separate property agreement. 166 The writing requirement of
4800.1 substantially impaired that interest. To the extent that the
statute restructures already existing transactions, it is not a divi-
sion-at-divorce statute and is therefore subject to constitutional
scrutiny.
Since 4800.1 was enacted after the Buols' dissolution proceed-
ings had commenced, the time had long passed for Esther Buol to
satisfy the writing requirement. It seems clear that at least as to
all proceedings pending at the time 4800.1 was enacted, it is im-
possible to comply with its statute of frauds requirement. When
exactly in the timeline of transactions that occur from the time
marital property is acquired in joint form to the time a dissolution
proceeding is commenced the constitutional bar to the application
of 4800.1 applies is still unclear and the supreme court has not
ruled. However, at least one family law commentator has stated
that the final point at which the separate property contributor can
protect his or her rights within the constraints of 4800.1 is at the
time of the transaction in which property is taken in joint form.1
67
In support of the above supposition, post-Buol appellate court
decisions have consistently held that the Buol constitutionality re-
straint makes the section 4800.1 presumption currently applicable
only to post-1984 proceedings in which marital property was ac-
quired or converted into joint tenancy form after January 1,
1984.168 Therefore, it appears that the form of title rebuttal stan-
163. Id.
164. Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 343, 26 P.2d 477, 479 (1933).
165. Prior to the new post-1985 transmutation statutes calling for a writing, trans-
mutation from community to separate property could be accomplished by any means in-
cluding an oral agreement between the spouses.
166. In re Marriage of Buol at 30, 755, 705 P.2d at 358, 218 Cal Rptr. at 34.
167. See Adams & Sevitch, supra note 30, at §§ D.11.5.0.2-11.5.3.
168. In re Marriage of Lockman, 204 Cal. App. 3d 782, 251 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1988);
In re Marriage of Cairo, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 251 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1988); Bankovich v.
Bankovich, 203 Cal. App. 3d 49, 249 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1988); In re Marriage of Hopkins &
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dard of Lucas is still relevant in situations where Buol would find
retroactive application of the new evidentiary standard to be
unconstitutional.
16 9
In 1986, the Legislature amended 4800.1 effective January 1,
1987, to find the retroactive application of the statute constitu-
tionally permissible because it serves a compelling state interest:
the uniform treatment of jointly-held marital property.1 70 The Su-
preme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of the retro-
active application of amended 4800.1; however in Bankovich v.
Bankovich,171 the Fourth District Court of Appeal found the same
failure of due process in amended 4800.1 and refused to apply
4800.2 to reimburse a separate property contribution to joint ten-
ancy property acquired prior to January 1, 1984.172 Of course,
4800.1, even amended, does not apply either to untitled commu-
nity property or community property acquired in the name of one
spouse alone; in such cases, prevailing case law would dictate the
evidentiary standard. 3
The enactment of A.B. 26 potentially impacts on a number of
venerable community property doctrines. For example, how the
4800.1 presumption will effect the tracing of assets in a commin-
gled fund at marital dissolution is a yet to be addressed issue.7 4
In In re Marriage of Mix, 17 5 the California Supreme Court re-
stated the rule that although a bank account established and used
Axene, 199 Cal. App. 3d 288, 244 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1987) (agreeing with Griffis); In re
Marriage of Griffis, 187 Cal. App. 3d 156, 231 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1986); In re Marriage of
Delgado, 176 Cal. App. 3d, 222 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1986) (in dicta).
169. HOGOBOOM & KING, supra note 11, at § 8:101.20. It is interesting to note that
the 1983 version of 4800.1 spoke only to joint tenancies, not all jointly-held property. This
created a anomalous situation where the evidentiary standard for rebutting a community
property presumption for joint was more difficult than the evidentiary standard for rebut-
ting the community property presumption when property was titled "to husband and wife,
as community property." The 1986 version of 4800.1 has corrected this oversight by requir-
ing a writing to rebut the community property presumption for all jointly-titled property
including property held in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, or as
community property. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.1 enacted by 1986 Cal. Stat., ch. 539.
170. See supra note 4. Amended 4800.1 creates a community property presumption
and statute of frauds rebuttal requirement for all jointly-held property acquired during
marriage thereby providing uniform treatment for characterizing marital property whether
titled as tenancy-in-common, community property or joint tenancy.
171. 203 Cal. App. 3d 49, 248 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1988).
172. In Bankovich, the parties had not agreed either orally or in writing to maintain
husband's separate property interest as was required under pre-4800.1 law; therefore, hus-
band's only possible recovery was pursuant to the reimbursement section of 4800.2.
173. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
174. It appears that at issue as well is whether a jointly-titled commingled fund can
still exist or whether the 4800.1 and 4800.2 have impliedly overruled all law pertaining to
tracing to a jointly-titled commingled fund. Of course, if the commingled account is held in
the name of either spouse, then exhaustion or direct tracing should still be available to
identify the separate and community property.
175. 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975).
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during marriage is presumptively community property, if separate
property contributions can be traced, the separate property propo-
nent will have met his or her burden of overcoming the commu-
nity property presumption. However, in In re Marriage of Hay-
den,17 6 the court refused to allow tracing. In Hayden, wife sold
her undisputed separate property and placed the proceeds in a
bank account which she later transmuted by changing title to joint
tenancy with her spouse. The Hayden court, applying the logic of
Lucas,1 77 refused to allow Mix-type tracing to rebut the joint ten-
ancy form of title presumption requiring instead evidence of an
agreement that the property was to be characterized as other than
joint tenancy.17 8 If the Hayden analysis is sound, then 4800.1
would similarly impose a community property presumption as to
the account. A writing would be required to rebut the community
property presumption which, if overcome, would allow the separa-
tizer to trace his or her property from a commingled account us-
ing the doctrines of either See v. See17 9 or Hicks v. Hicks.180 If
the separate property spouse could not sustain the 4800.1 statute
of frauds rebuttal burden, then 4800.2 gives a right of reimburse-
ment for traceable separate property without regard to interest for
her separate property contributions. It appears that the division of
a commingled account may well turn on the form of title of the
account.18'
California has recently enacted legislation which speaks directly
to the See and Mix commingled bank account. California Probate
Code section 5305, enacted in 1983,82 creates a presumption that
contributions to a joint bank account of married persons are pre-
sumed to be community property, thereby reversing the common
law presumption of form of title.'8 This presumption, which is
similar to the one created by 4800.1, may be rebutted either by
the showing of a written agreement to the contrary, creating a
statute of frauds rebuttal burden similar to that of 4800.1,184 or
by tracing such contributions to a separate property source.' 85 The
176. 124 Cal. App: 3d 72, 177 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1981).
177. Id. at 77, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86 (1981).
178. Id.
179. See v. See. 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
180. Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1962).
181. See BLUMBERG supra note 12, at 228.
182. CAL. PROB. CODE § 5305 (West Supp. 1989). Since 5305 had not been enacted
at the time of the Hayden decision, the court could not rely on its community property
presumption and rebuttal standard. The Multiple-Accounts sections of the California Pro-
bate code are modeled after similar sections in the Uniform Probate Code.
183. See generally Griffith, supra note 2, at 93-94 for results reached by courts
straining to overcome the joint tenancy presumption.
184. CAL, PROB. CODE § 5305(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
185. CAL. PROB. CODE § 5305(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989). Note the similarity in re-
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tracing rebuttal burden of 5305, which should be an easier one for
the separate property proponent to sustain than a writing require-
ment, puts section 5305 in line with the rebuttal burdens required
of a separate property proponent trying to overcome the general or
time of acquisition community property presumption and prove
separate contributions to a commingled account.
Although the sections dealing with multiple-party accounts are
modeled after similar sections in the Uniform Probate Code, cer-
tain adaptions were required to deal with community property.
Section 5305, creating the community property presumption, has
no counterpart in the UPC.18 The California Law Revision Com-
mission Comment to this section specifically states that tracing
shall suffice to overcome the community property presumption for
a commingled account. 187 This expression of legislative intent
seems to clarify the position that, at least as to multiple-party ac-
counts, Probate Code section 5305 is intended to supercede Civil
Code section 4800.1.1188 Since 5305 speaks specifically to tracing
separate property in commingled accounts, one would have to con-
clude that the tracing doctrines of Hicks and See are still alive.
The Comment specifically reiterates the California judicial doc-
trine that if community and separate property or funds are com-
mingled in such a manner that it is impossible to trace the source
of the property or funds, the whole will be treated as community
property.189
IV. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW OR "WHO'S ON FIRST?"
A. California Civil Code Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2
Assembly Bill 26 enacted not only section 4800.1 but also sec-
tion 4800.2.190 This section, which applies only to community
property, reverses the gift presumption which historically has per-
vaded marital property law.191 Prior to 4800.2, if one of the
buttal standards between 5305 and 4800.1 as originally proposed. See supra note 7.
186. Recommendation Relating to Nonprobate Transfers, 16 CAL. L. REVISION
COMNI'N REPORTS 129, 171 (1982) [hereinafter Nonprobate Transfers].
187. Id. at 174.
188. Proposed legislation would explicitly amend CAL. PROB. CODE § 5305(b) to
override CAL CIv. CODE §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2. Senate Bill 985 (1989)
189. Patterson v. Patterson, 242 Cal. App. 2d 333, 341, 51 Cal. Rptr. 339, 345
(1966).
190. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1986); see supra note 5.
191. The presumption of a gift of community property to the separate estate absent
an agreement to the contrary may well have its origins in the pre-1975 community property
system in which all community property was exclusively managed by the husband. Because
husband had exclusive control over the community property, any time that he used commu-
nity property to enhance his wife's separate property or took title to community assets in
her name alone, a gift was presumed. If either husband or wife made a separate property
19891
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spouses contributed his or her separate property to the commu-
nity, absent an agreement to the contrary, a gift to the community
was presumed. 19 2 The legislature, recognizing an inherent unfair-
ness in potentially depriving the separate property spouse of his or
her contribution, enacted section 4800.2 as remedial legislation;
this section gives the separate property estate a creditor's interest
free right of reimbursement in the property9" absent a written
waiver to the contrary.
1 94
In In re Marriage of Fabian," 5 the California Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of the retroactive application of
4800.2. Kathleen and James Fabian purchased a motel, taking ti-
tle as husband and wife, as community property. Prior to marital
separation, James invested $275,000 of his separate property in
the motel. The trial court, finding no Lucas agreement or under-
standing of reimbursement or repayment, held that James had
made a gift of his separate property to the community. 96 James
contribution to community property, a gift was presumed absent an agreement to the con-
trary since the contributing spouse had exclusive management and control of his or her
separate property.
192. Machado v. Machado, 58 Cal. 2d 501, 375 P.2d 55, 25 Cal Rptr. 87 (1962)
(joint tenancy deed for real property); In re Marriage of Frapwell, 49 Cal. App. 3d 597,
122 Cal Rptr. 718 (1975) (conversion of separate property bank accounts to joint tenancy);
In re Marriage of Bjornestad, 38 Cal. App. 3d 801, 113 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1974) (5110
single-family residence community property presumption); In re Marriage of Lucas, 27
Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. (1980) (approving of In re Marriage of Bjornes-
tad); In re Marriage of Cademartori, 119 Cal. App. 3d 970, 174 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1981)
(extending the joint tenancy form of title rebuttal standard of Lucas to property titled as
community property).
193. Note that the right of reimbursement in 4800.2 is doctrinally unsound in light
of California's long history of recognizing that marital property can be an admixture of
both community and separate with a right of pro rata apportionment in each estate. See
e.g. Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 P. 640 (1926) (approving apportionment be-
tween the community and separate property estate in an installment contract); Forbes v.
Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 257 P.2d 721 (1953) (recognizing a pro tanto community
property interest in mixed property); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152
Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979) (set out the apportionment scheme for the pro tanto interests of the
estates which was approved by the supreme court in Lucas); In re Marriage of Moore, 28
Cal. 3d 366, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662, 618 P.2d 208 (1980) (defining the proper method of
calculating community interest in a separate property estate). The 4800.2 approach to
mixed property seems more similar to the view adopted by other community property states
that the character of property is fixed by the character of the initial contributions and that,
at best, the out-estate may have a mere right of reimbursement. At least as to "community
property," the legislature seems to have impliedly overruled the well-established doctrine of
buying into title. See generally, W. REPPY, JR., & C. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES 77-83 (2d ed. 1982). It seems clear, however, that if 4800.2 does not
apply, either because the property is not community, the community property presumption
is rebutted, or because of the Fabian unconstitutionality constraint, pro rata apportionment
is still applicable. Accord., Hogoboom & King, supra note 11 at §§ 8:70-8:80.2.
194. For what constitutes a waiver, see infra notes 221-32 and accompanying text.
195. 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986).
196. Since title to the property had been expressed affirmatively as husband and
wife, the Lucas and Cademartori rebuttal requirements pertained. Id. at 445-46, 714 P.2d
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appealed and while the appeal was pending, section 4800.2 was
enacted as part of Assembly Bill 26.
The California Supreme Court found that the retroactive appli-
cation of 4800.2 impaired Kathleen's property right in the motel
which had vested at the time title was taken in community prop-
erty with no agreement or understanding that James would be re-
imbursed for his investment.197 Using the identical due process
analysis as in Buol, the court found no significant state interest
that cured a "rank injustice" and held the application of the stat-
ute in Fabian unconstitutional. 198
In response to the decisions of Buol and Fabian, the Legislature
enacted urgency legislation 99 to repeal the retroactive application
of 4800.1 and 4800.2 to all proceedings commenced prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1984.200 The 1986 legislation also affirmed the legislature's
intent to have 4800.1 and 4800.2 apply to all property, regardless
of date of acquisition, in cases where the proceeding was filed af-
ter January 1, 1984. In two statements of intent, currently incor-
porated in the 1987 version of 4800.1,201 the legislation cites both
confusion of the bar and bench and frustration of legislative intent
caused by Buol as well as a compelling state interest in the provi-
sion of uniform treatment of property as the reasons for the appli-
cability of A.B. 26 to preenactment property.0 2 Additionally, sec-
tion 4800.1 was amended to apply to all property held in joint
at 256, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
197. Since 4800.2 was enacted some one and one-half years after the trial court
rendered its judgment in the Fabians' dissolution matter, compliance with the waiver re-
quirement of 4800.2 was impossible. For a similar analysis in Buol, see supra notes 162-63
and accompanying text.
198. In re Marriage of Fabian at 449, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338
(1986). See supra note 155 for analysis of California's long-established retroactivity bal-
ancing test.
199. See 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 49, see 2, at 91-92 (specifically refers to Buol in the text
of the statute).
200. Id., see 1, at 91.
201. See supra note 4; see also Recommendation on 4800.1 and 4800.2, supra note
116, at 389 where the Law Revision Commission recommqnds that the new legislation
should apply to all proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1984 regardless of when
the property was acquired, an approach which is consistent with a reasonable reading of
Buol. Such an approach, the Commission goes on to say, treats fairly those parties who
have relied on an oral agreement; oral agreements in other than dissolution matters are still
a valid rebuttal standard. Casual statements made during marriage affecting interspousal
property rights are not made with full knowledge of their consequences or with the inten-
tion of the parties that they change the rights of the parties if the marriage is dissolved. Id.
at note 10. Query how a spouse who brings separate property into a marriage, converts it to
joint tenancy for whatever reason but based on an understanding that said property will
remain his or her separate property, would respond to such a statement.
202. Preenactment property is all interspousal property acquired in or converted into
joint title prior to January 1, 1984 in cases where the proceeding was not filed prior to
January 1, 1984. See Flagg, supra note 13, at 55, n. 201.
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title.203
More than one appellate court has spoken to the retroactive ap-
plication of amended 4800.1 and 4800.2. In re Marriage of Grif-
fis204 was the first case to address the applicability of 4800.1 and
4800.2 as amended by the urgency legislation making these sec-
tions applicable to all proceedings commenced on or after January
1 1984, regardless of when the property was acquired. The Griffis
court stated the rule, approved by the court In re Marriage of
Hopkins and Axene,205 that even when the date of the proceeding
falls squarely within the constraints of the amended statute, it is
still constitutionally defective to apply 4800.1 and 4800.2 to pree-
nactment property. The vested property right identified in Buol
attaches at the time during the marriage that the property is ac-
quired or converted into joint form. It is then that it is too late for
the separate property contributor to get a writing rebutting the
community property presumption of 4800.1 and for the commu-
nity to obtain a 4800.2 waiver of reimbursement. 0 6
Bankovich v. Bankovich20 7 is the first case to address the issue
of retroactive application of 4800.1 and 4800.2, as amended. The
Fourth District court held that notwithstanding a more compre-
hensive explication of the state's interest in the retroactive appli-
cation of the statutes, "[w]here it has been firmly established by
the courts these provisions cannot be applied to property rights
acquired before January 1, 1984, the constitutional defect cannot
be erased by mere legislative announcement." (emphasis added)208
Simply an announcement that a state interest is compelling is not
sufficient to make it so. Since Bankovich, a number of appellate
courts have spoken to the statute as amended and have rendered
substantially similar decisions.20 9
To date, the supreme court has not spoken to the amended leg-
203. Amended 4800.1 now applies to all jointly-titled interspousal property including
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties and community property. This
change takes care of the anomaly created by a statute which established a more difficult
burden to rebut the community property presumption for joint tenancy community prop-
erty than for titled community property. See Bankovich v. Bankovich, 203 Cal. App. 3d 49,
249 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988) (referring to the objection of the Buol court to this lack of
uniformity); In re Marriage of Buol, 29 Cal. 3d 751, 762, 705 P.2d 354, 361, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 31, 38 (1985).
204. 187 Cal. App. 3d 156, 231 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1986).
205. 199 Cal. App. 3d 288, 244 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1988).
206. In re Marriage of Griflis at 165, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 515 citing Adams & Sevitch,
supra note 30, § D.l1.5.3a at D-12 - D-13.
207. 203 Cal. App. 3d 49, 249 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1988).
208. Id. at 55, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
209. See In re Marriage of Lockman, 204 Cal. App. 3d 782, 251 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1988); In re Marriage of Cairo, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 251 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1988); In re
Marriage of Reilly, as modified, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 242 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1987); In re
Marriage of Columbo, as modified, 197 Cal. App. 3d 572, 242 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1987).
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islation. There has been a flurry of speculation about the
probability of the supreme court granting review of the amended
legislation. Stephen Adams and Nancy Sevitch, well-known com-
mentators in the family law area and editors of California Family
Law Practice, have speculated that Bankovich is likely to be the
last word that we hear on the application of sections 4800.1 and
4800.2. When the appellate court declined to publish its opinion in
the case of In re Marriage of Hopkins and Axene, the California
Supreme Court ordered it published. At a subsequent conference
of judges and attorneys, a number of justices were overheard to
say that the Supreme Court virtually never orders publication
contrary to the recommendation of an appellate court. "We be-
lieve then that the justices were trying to tell us they are finished
with the issue, and that this probably is as close to a final decision
as we're going to get."21 0
Section 4800.2 permits the separate property contributors to
claim a reimbursement from the community for separate property
contributions to a community property based on mere tracing un-
less the contributor has signed a waiver of the right of reimburse-
ment or signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver. What
constitutes an effective waiver is an issue which has been ad-
dressed by at least two courts of appeal with regard to cases
where the transaction creating the community property fell
squarely within the requirements of 4800.2 with no Fabian consti-
tutional defect. 1'
In In re Marriage of Witt,21 2 the wife converted a separate
property farm to community property with an acknowledged oral
intent of making a gift to the community. The sixth district, not-
ing the similarity of these facts to Fabian,13 upheld the trial
court's ruling that absent a written waiver of the right of reim-
bursement, wife was entitled to reimbursement for her separate
property contribution.
The holding in Witt, while certainly in compliance with the lan-
guage of 4800.2, demonstrates some logical inconsistencies in the
spirit of the statute. If an express legislative purpose of A.B. 26 is
210. See Adams & Sevitch, supra note 30, at 3514 (1988).
211. To be constitutional under the guidelines of Buol/Fabian and their progeny, the
proceeding at issue must have commenced on or after January 1, 1984 and the property at
issue must have been acquired at the same date.
212. 197 Cal. App. 3d 103, 242 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1987).
213. In Fabian, the court found no evidence of an agreement to maintain husband's
separate property interest which would have been required to rebut the objective gift pre-
sumption of pre-4800.2 law. In Witt, while there was also no evidence of an agreement to
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to strengthen the community,1 4 permitting a spouse to abrogate
his or her express intent to make a gift to the community after the
fact is inapposite. The requirement of a written waiver to rebut
the presumption of reimbursement creates a sword for the sepa-
rate property spouse who, in light of the crumbling marriage, gets
the benefit of a second look at his gift. Furthermore, since the
courts will not look behind the community's failure to obtain a
4800.2 waiver, the separate property contributor may always as-
sert the 4800.2 right of reimbursement which has been fixed from
the time of acquisition or conversion of the property in presump-
tively community form.21 5 That the community relied on the con-
tributing spouse's expression of intent to make a gift is apparently
irrelevant; 16 knowledge of the new evidentiary standard of 4800.2
is imputed to the community.
The 4800.2 right of reimbursement was intended specifically to
mitigate the potentially harsh results to the contributing spouse of
the abrogation of oral agreements by the 4800.1 statute of
frauds.21  It is indeed anomalous that 4800.2 reimburses a spouse
who, like Mrs. Witt, intended to make a gift to the community
and communicated that intent to her spouse in the same manner
as a spouse whose oral agreement to be reimbursed has been abro-
gated by the 4800.1 writing requirement s While it appears that
the legislature intended the 4800.2 writing requirement to en-
courage spouses to memorialize all of their mixed property trans-
actions,2"9 it is equally true that Mrs. Witt's failure to execute a
written waiver in statutory compliance with her intent to make a
gift or Mr. Witt's failure to request one is empirical evidence that
knowledge of marital property law is outside the purview of most
married couples. 2
214. See Recommendation on 4800.1 and 4800.2, supra note 116, at 387.
215. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
216. In re Marriage of Witt at 107-08, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 649 (1987).
217. See Recommendation on 4800.1 and 4800.2, supra note 116, at 388.
218. This is the exact situation of Witt where wife acknowledged her intent to make
a gift to the community at the time that the conveyance to the community was made; at
marital dissolution, she was able to have reimbursement by asserting the 4800.2 written
waiver requirement. Query whether the court in Witt is inadvertently articulating a condi-
tional gift doctrine. Traditionally, a completed gift requires donative intent and delivery,
both of which were present in Witt. What the court is saying is that the gift is conditional
upon the marriage staying intact.
219. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 158. Imputing knowledge of the law is not the exclusive province
of the legislature. In Buol and Fabian, the supreme court imputed knowledge the vesting of
property rights to both Esther Buol and Kathleen Fabian in order to make reliance argu-
ments on behalf of both of them against the retroactive application of 4800.1 and 4800.2.
While the imputed knowledge was easier to show in the case of Esther Buol, the court had
no trouble finding that Kathleen must have relied because of the "legitimacy of such reli-
ance" notwithstanding that there was almost no evidence of reliance. Marriage of Fabian
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In Perkal v. Perkal,221 the court found that husband had not
made an effective waiver of his right of reimbursement by the act
of interlineating the words "For a Valuable Consideration the Re-
ceipt of Which is Hereby Acknowledged" on the grant deed con-
verting his separate property into joint tenancy with his wife and
substituting thereto the words "For a Gift.' ' 222 The court held that
since the waiver is a voluntary act it requires actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the right being waived. In Perkal, testimony
had shown that husband's intent in using the words "For a Gift"
was to avoid payment of the documentary transfer tax and to ob-
viate the possibility of a property tax reassessment. The court
found that although husband's motives were not laudatory, they
did not show any intent to make a gift.2
It is difficult to reconcile the rules of Witt and Perkal regard-
ing the role that parol evidence of intent plays in the waiver re-
quirement of 4800.1. In Witt, parol evidence of intent was not
sufficient to waive reimbursement absent a writing. In Perkal, a
writing was insufficient because parol evidence demonstrated a
lack of intent to make a gift.
Since the 4800.2 presumption of nongift runs in favor of the
separate estate, the courts impute knowledge of the waiver re-
quirement to the community which must obtain a written waiver
in order to protect its interest. Such knowledge need not be im-
puted to the separate estate which has the benefit of the nongift
presumption. The presumption that a nongift was intended has
different consequences depending on whether the intent to make a
gift was actually present at the time of the transaction. Mrs.
Witt's lack of knowledge of the waiver requirement acted as a
sword, allowing her to assert the 4800.2 right of reimbursement
notwithstanding her prior intent to make a gift. Mr. Perkal's lack
of knowledge, on the other hand, acted as a shield which protected
his right of reimbursement notwithstanding having executed a
writing. It seems only a knowledgeable waiver will suffice to nul-
lify 4800.2's right of reimbursement.224 Since it is unlikely that
most couples will have any real knowledge of 4800.2, the doctrine
of separate property gifts to the community is at risk. 25
at 449, 715 P.2d at 258-59, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39 (1986).
221. 203 Cal. App. 3d 1198, 250 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1988).
222. Id. at 1203, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
223. How the writing requirement of 4800.2 will square with the writing require-
ment of section 5110.730 is not at all clear particularly with regard to the 5110.730(d)
exception for property which is an admixture of both community and separate. Whereas
4800.2 does not recognize the admixture concept ("In the division of community property..
"), apparently 5110.730 does.
224. Id. at 1204, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
225. It appears that the legislature is attempting to completely discourage inter-
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Both the language of 4800.2 and the judicial restrictions of its
applicability create confusion and uncertainty. To the extent that
the 4800.2 has not entirely co-opted the area of separate property
reimbursement, California's only recently-settled doctrine of pro
rata apportionment still applies.22 6 Clearly an asset which is not
community property falls without the reach of 4800.2 which
speaks only to the division of community property.22
Any separate property of either spouse acquired prior to mar-
riage or acquired onerously during marriage which has not been
converted to community property by a change in form of title or
has not been transmuted to community property, to which the
community has made a contribution, is still subject to division by
the pro rata apportionment rules.228 As to such property, mere
tracing to the source of funds will suffice as proof of the character
of the contribution. It seems clear that the pro rata apportionment
doctrine of Moore/Marsden lives on for community contributions
to separate property.
229
For property which is acquired by one spouse in his or her name
during marriage with a combination of community and separate
property, the effect, if any, of 4800.2 is not at all clear.2 a0 Such a
situation should not cause a form of title presumption to arise in
favor of a separate property characterization.231 Since the prop-
erty was acquired during the marriage, the general community
property presumption which attach. If the acquiring spouse can
spousal gifts. The newly enacted interspousal transmutation writing requirements effec-
tively make all interspousal gifts, except those specifically excepted by CAL CIv. CODE §
5110.730(c), revocable at the termination of the marriage by dissolution or death absent a
writing to the contrary.
226. It was not until 1980 that the California Supreme Court finally ruled on how
the community and separate interest in mixed property should be handled. In In re Mar-
riage of Lucas at 816, note 3, 614 P.2d at 290 at note 3, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858 note 3
(1980), the court, resolving a long-standing conflict among the districts as to how to treat
property acquired during marriage which was an admixture of community and separate,
approved the apportionment formula set out in In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App.
3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). In In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3dd 366, 618 P.2d
208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980), the court approved the pro rata apportionment formula for
calculating community contributions to separate property.
227. CAL. CIv. CODE 4800.2 (West Supp. 1986).
228. See In re Marriage of Leversee, 156 Cal. App. 3d 891, 203 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1984).
229. See supra note 20.
230. Blumberg, supra note 12, at 194. Professor Blumberg notes that appart from
the policy served by the content of 4800.2, the articulation of this content is fundamentally
misconceived and "reveals a critical ignorance of California community property doctrine"
which has always recognized that property which is purchased with community and sepa-
rate property gives rise to an asset which is both community and separate in nature.
231. Since title is in the name of the spouse who used community property to acquire
the property, it would be self-serving to assign the benefit of a separate property presump-
tion to such a spouse since it cannot be presumed that the nonacquiring spouse has given
his or her consent to the attempted transmutation of community property.
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trace to a separate property source, the community property pre-
sumption will be rebutted and 4800.2 will not apply. In such a
situation, the division of the property presumably will be governed
by the law as articulated in Lucas and Aufmuth.
Any postenactment property acquired during marriage or con-
verted during marriage into joint title is subject to the community
property presumption of 4800.1 and its written proof of rebut-
tal 232 If the presumption cannot be successfully rebutted,233 the
separatizer will have a 4800.2 right of reimbursement assuming
no waiver has been made. Under this theory, the separate prop-
erty contribution to community property (which may indeed have
been separate property in the first instance),234 is treated like an
interest-free loan to the community.235 Title has fixed the charac-
ter of property in the community which gets the benefit of all
post-acquisition or post-conversion appreciation. 23 6 Therefore, as
to separate contributions to 4800.1 community property, the pro
rata apportionment doctrine of Lucas/Aufmuth is gone. As to
preenactment titled community or spousal joint tenancy property,
the Lucas/Aufmuth doctrine is still viable. 37
If the 4800.1 presumption, as applied to post-enactment prop-
erty, can be overcome by the showing of a writing, then the asset
or some part of it is not presumptively community property and
therefore not subject to the reimbursement right of 4800.2. If the
property is an admixture of community and separate property and
either estate can trace its contributions, pro rata apportionment
will not only reimburse such estate for its contributions but also
allocate the appreciation.
232. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
233. If the 4800.1 statute of frauds requirement is met, the community property
presumption is overcome and the separate property contributor may have pro rata appor-
tionment as to any separate property contribution which can be traced.
234. In In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1984),
Mrs. Neal had converted title of her separate property residence into joint tenancy at the
demand of a financial institution. Had this situation been constitutionally proper, a court
would have been compelled to characterize the property as community since 4800.1 has no
provision for looking behind the transaction to the reason for form of title. To the extent of
the situation in Neal, it is the intent-of-the-lender, not the intent of the contributing
spouse, that was controlling. The value of the 4800.2 right of reimbursement is the value of
the property at the time of its conversion to joint tenancy form. See 83 Sen. Rept, supra
note 7, at 3865-66.
235. CAL. Civ. CODE 4800.2 (West Supp. 1986).
236. See supra note 189. It has been noted that the judiciary has strongly criticized
the inequity of this rule when the separate property spouse has made essentially all contri-
butions to the 4800.1 presumptively community property and is unable to rebut success-
fully. See HOGOBOO, & KING, supra -note 11, § 8:102.15 and Comment.
237. Buol/Fabian and progeny have apparently concluded that 4800.1 and 4800.2
are inapplicable to any preenactment property and the supreme court has not again spoken
in this issue. See supra 204-16 and accompanying text.
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If property acquired during marriage is untitled or taken in the
name of one spouse, any credible evidence will be sufficient to re-
but the general community property assumption.238 Again, if such
property is an admixture of community and separate, pro rata ap-
portionment will be applicable. Property acquired in joint form
prior to marriage does not raise either the 4800.1 community
property presumption or the general community property
presumption.
B. Death of a Spouse
1. Character of Property
The consequences of form of title are quite different at the
death of the first spouse to die. If title to the property is as joint
tenants, then the surviving spouse will take the whole by right of
survivorship. 39 Since form of title creates only a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the character of the property is as indicated by ti-
tle,240 a devisee of the property under the will of the deceased
spouse may test the surviving spouse's claim by proof that the
spousal joint tenancy is really community property.241 Prior to
1985, parol evidence was sufficient to prove that the character of
the property was other than as indicated by title.242 Such evidence
was respected with regard to proceedings to administer the estate
of the deceased spouse. Therefore, the one-half of the community
property belonging to the deceased spouse would have been trans-
ferred either to such devisees named in the will of the decedent or
to his intestate heirs.243
In 1985, the California Legislature overturned a long history of
oral transmutations of marital property with the codification of
statutes requiring a writing to effect a transmutation.244 Prior to
238. Such evidence includes tracing to a separate property source, an oral agreement
as to the character of the property, an antenuptial agreement, agreement that the property
was acquired as a gift.
239. CAL. CIv. CODE § 683 (West Supp. 1989). Since 4800.1 and 4800.2 do not
apply at death, no presumption of community property arises. Unless the joint tenancy
property can be shown to be community property, it is not subject to administration in the
estate of the decedent. Estate of Zaring, 93 Cal. 2d 577, 209 P.2d 642 (1949). True joint
tenancy property also is not available to satisfy the claims of decedent's creditors.
240. See supra notes 40, 42, 47 and accompanying text.
241. Sandrini v. Ambrosetti, 111 Cal. App. 2d 439, 447-51, 244 P.2d 742, 748-50
(1952).
242. Estate of Blair at 167, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 631; Estate of Levine, 125 Cal. App.
3d 701, 705, 178 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 (1981); Estate of Baglione, 165 Cal. 2d 192, 195,
417, P.2d 683, 686, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139, 142 (1966).
243. Cal, Prob. Code §§ 6101(b), 6401(a), & 6402 (West Supp. 1989).
244. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5110.710-740 (West Supp. 1989); See Recommendation Re-
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the effective date of this legislation, courts had recognized oral
transmutations; after January 1, 1985, only a section 5110.730
writing will effect a transmutation. 45 Since section 4800.1 is not
applicable to death situations, an attempt by one spouse to devise
post-1984 joint tenancy community property to someone other
than the surviving spouse will be a nullity unless the presump-
tively joint tenancy property has been transmuted to community
property by a 5110.730 writing.248 The viability of the form of
title joint tenancy presumption at the death of one spouse coupled
with the requirement for a writing to effect a transmutation is
precisely the opposite of the prevailing presumption in dissolution
cases. Through the combined effects of sections 4800.1, 4800.2
and 5110.730, the legislature has given life but no official recogni-
tion to the community property with right of survivorship hybrid
estate.
How the 5110.730 writing requirement will affect other situa-
tions where oral transmutations have been respected in the past is
yet to be seen. Spouses frequently rely on post-death confirmations
lating to Marital Property Presumption and Transmutations, 17 CAL L. REVISION
COMM'N 207 (1984); Woods v. Security Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 701, 199 P.2d 657,
659 (1956).
245. Query what will be sufficient to satisfy the 5110.730 writing requirement.
5110.730 specifically calls for a written express declaration that is made, joined in, con-
sented to or accepted by the spouse whose interest is adversely affected. A quitclaim deed
converting community property to the separate property of one of the spouses has been held
sufficient to work a transmutation. See e.g. Kennedy v. Taylor, 155 Cal. App. 3d 126, 210
Cal. Rptr. 770 (1984); Marriage of Stoner, 147 Cal. App. 3d 858, 195 Cal. Rptr. 351
(1983). If a quitclaim deed is sufficient to work a transmutation for the purpose of fulfilling
the writing requirement of 5110.730 (note that both cited case were pre-1985, the effective
date of the statute), will a transfer by deed from separate property to joint tenancy create a
binding transmutation on the separate property spouse regardless of the reason for such a
transfer. Such a transmutation, although having the advantage of eliminating inherently
unreliable parol evidence has as little to do with the intent of the transmuting party as the
community property presumption of 4800.1 Although there is no express language in
5110.730, parol evidence will not be permitted to show that the joint tenancy property is
really the separate property of one of the spouses. (But see possible substitutes for a writing
as articulated in Freitas and Sheldon.) To that extent, 5110.730 creates the same eviden-
tiary burden as 4800.1.
The writing requirement for antenuptial agreements found at Cal. Civ. Code § 5311
(West Supp. 1989) has been found to be otherwise satisfied. In Freitas v. Freitas, 31 Cal.
App. 16, 159 P. 611 (1916), the court found that an oral antenuptial agreement which was
fully executed by performance on the part of the parties was no longer subject to the
statute of frauds requirement. In Estate of Sheldon, 75 Cal. App. 3d 364, 142 Cal. Rptr.
199 (1977), the doctrine of estoppel was held to prohibit the party denying the existence of
antenuptial agreement from raising the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense.
246. See Estate of Blair at 167-68, 244 at 631 (1988); See also CAL. CIv. CODE §
5110.740 (West Supp. 1989) which codifies the rule that prior to the death of the decedent
spouse, statements in his or her will regarding the character of the property are ineffective
to work a transmutation. This statute recognizes the revocability of wills and their ambula-
tory nature; wills are ineffective until the death of the decedent since he or she may modify
or revoke the will at any time prior to death.
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that marital property held in joint tenancy is really community
property for purposes of securing the Internal Revenue Code Sec-
tion 1014(b)(6) step-up in income tax basis for both halves of the
community at the death of the first spouse to die.24 Under IRS
construction of its rules, if the property held in a common law
estate is community property under state law, it is community
property for the purposes of applying I.R.C. 1014(b)(6).24 Prior
California law has made clear that if an agreement to transmute
could be demonstrated by the surviving spouse, then the character
of the property was as the parties had agreed notwithstanding ti-
tle; the law of oral transmutation made the application of I.R.C.
1014(a)(6) relatively easy. For post-Januhry 1, 1985 transactions,
however, the 5110.730 writing requirement makes parol evidence
inadmissible to prove that marital property held in joint tenancy is
really community property. The surviving spouse, alleging the
community character of the property, will be required to produce
a writing which satisfies 5110.73049 since neither the community
property presumptions of section 4800.1 or section 5305 are appli-
cable at death.
An interesting situation arises when joint tenancy property is
unilaterally severed by one of the joint tenants during the lifetime
of the joint tenants. California has long recognized the right of
unilateral severance of joint tenancy real property.250 Since 1980,
this right of unilateral severance may be accomplished by direct
transfer from the joint tenant desiring a severance to himself, as a
tenant in common.25'
247. Int. Rev. Code § 1014(b)(6) (CCH 1988).
248. Rev. Rul. 87-98 (1987-2 C.B.).
249. The California Probate Code, at CAL. PROB. CODE § 13650 (West Supp. 1989),
allows community property of the decedent that is passing to the surviving spouse to be
transferred without the necessity of an administration. As a part of this community prop-
erty set-aside, the surviving spouse may request confirmation of the property as community.
Under this section, joint tenancy marital property could be confirmed as community prop-
erty. Whether section 13650 will require a 5110.730 writing to so confirm is not yet clear.
Whether the Internal Revenue Service will look to the probate code's community property
confirmation proceeding or to the civil code's writing requirement as the law regarding the
community property character of joint tenancy property for the purposes of'satisfying
I.R.C. Rev. Ruling 87098 is also not clear. Id.
250. Hammon v. McArthur, 30 Cal. 2d 512, 183 P.2d I (1947); Clark v. Carter, 265
Cal. App. 2d 291, 70 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1968); Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70
Cal. Rptr. 87 (1968).
251. Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 525, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1980). This right
of unilateral severance without necessity of a third-party strawman is currently codified at
CAL, CIV. CODE § 683.2 (West Supp. 1989). Prior to the codification of the holding of
Riddle v. Harmon, unilateral severance by the use of an intermediary had long been recog-
nized. But see Estate of Propst, 201 Cal. App. 3d 512, 247 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1988) for the
holding that a joint tenancy in personal property may not be unilaterally severed without
the consent of all of the joint tenants. Although the Propst court recognized the inherent
inconsistency of permitting unilateral severances of joint tenancies in real property but not
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This substantive property right attendant to joint tenancies does
not apply to community property; it is an estate which may not be
unilaterally terminated during the joint lifetimes of the spouses.
2 52
However, under the holding of Riddle v. Harmon, a community
joint tenancy in real property may be unilaterally severed .2 3 In
1984 and 1985, legislation was added to the civil code limiting the
application of Riddle.254 Effective January 1, 1986, a unilateral
severance of a joint tenancy is ineffective against the surviving
joint tenant unless the severance was recorded by the severing
joint tenant prior to his death. The purpose of this section is to
discourage a secret or fraudulent unilateral severance which de-
stroys the right of survivorship expectation of the surviving joint
tenants.2 55
The Comment to the Law Revision Commission Report states
an exception to the recordation rule: if the joint tenancy is held
between husband and wife and can be shown to be community
property, a lack of recordation mandated by 683.2 will not destroy
the effect of a testamentary disposition of the deceased spouse's
one-half interest.256 Presumably, with the addition of 5110.730 to
in personal property, it stated that the reason for the different rule lies in two much-misun-
derstood California Supreme Court cases: Estate of Harris, 169 Cal. 725, 147 P. 967
(1915) [known a Harris 1] and Estate of Harris, 9 Cal. 2d 649, 71 P.2d 873 (1937)
[known as Harris 11]. Estate of Propst at 519. These cases have stood for the rule that a
unilateral severance of joint bank account is impermissible. The court in Propst distin-
guished the two cases because of the existence of an interspousal agreement in Harris to
transmute the property to joint tenancy and no such agreement in Propst. Although the
Propst court felt that the holding in Harris should have been limited to the facts of that
case, it felt constrained to follow the precedent of Harris. Id. at 525. On October 27, 1988,
granted review to Estate of Propst.
252. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
253. Since the court in Riddle does not distinguish between spousal and nonspousal
joint tenancies, there is no inquiry at the time that one of the spouses performs an act
which results in an effective severance of the community property. Arguably, if the spouses
had a side agreement that the property was to remain joint tenancy, then the logic of
Harris might attach.
254. CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2(c) (West Supp. 1989).
255. This fraudulent intent had been the subject of at least on California case. Burke
v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1968) in which wife unilaterally severed
a joint tenancy in real property which had been purchased by her husband with title taken
in joint tenancy. There are other cases where the secret intent of the severing spouse had
not so clearly looked like fraud. Estate of Carpenter, 140 Cal. App. 3d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr.
651 (1983); Estate of Dean, 109 Cal. App. 3d 156, 167 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1980). See Recom-
mendation Relating to Recording Severance of Joint Tenancy, 18 CAL L. REVISION
COMNI'N, 253-54 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Severance of Joint Tenancy]; see also Fet-
ters, supra note 40 for the proposition that although secret unilateral severances are prob-
lematic, recordation of the severance is not necessarily the answer.
256. See Severance of Joint Tenancy, supra note 255, at 256; accord Sandrini v.
Ambrosetti, 111 Cal. App. 2d 439, 244 P.2d 742 (1952); Estate of Wilson, 64 Cal. App. 3d
786, 134 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1976). It is interesting to note that most of the reported cases of
secret or fraudulent severances of joint tenancies have been interspousal. Since spousal
joint tenancies where form of title can be rebutted by the showing of a writing are an
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the Civil Code such evidence will have to be in writing. 57 If there
is no writing and no recordation of the severance, the surviving
spouse takes the whole by right of survivorship.25 8 While 683.2
recognizes the community property incident of testamentary dis-
position, 5110.730 makes the incident impossible to execute with-
out a writing.25 For purposes of establishing that a spousal joint
tenancy is really community property at the death of one of the
spouses, the community property incident of unrestricted aliena-
bility is anything but unrestricted. This policy has the tendency to
recognize that spousal joint tenancies are often used as will substi-
tutes and to discourage spouses from holding title to community
property as husband and wife and availing themselves of the com-
munity property set-aside provisions of the California Probate
Code.26 o
2. Rights of Third-Party Creditors
Joint tenancy property has long been recognized as unavailable
to the deceased's creditors although such property would surely
have been available to such a creditor during the decedent's life-
time28 1 unless the creditor can show that the parties placed the
property in joint tenancy in fraud of creditors.262
It is the incident of right of survivorship which extinguishes the
decedent's interest immediately upon death. 63 Such rules regard..
ing spousal joint tenancies tend to favor the surviving joint tenant
exception to the recording requirements of 683.2, its scope is probably limited.
257. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.740 (West Supp. 1989) specifically excludes statementus
in the will of decedent made prior to his or her death as a writing sufficient to transmute.
However, to the extent that a devise in a will may be effective to satisfy the 5110.730
writing requirement, the effect of the Sandrini challenge of a devisee of community joint
tenancy property may be even broader.
258. In Sandrini, husband and wife held their property in joint tenancy and had
agreed that the survivor would take all of the marital property. Husband and wife each
executed wills; husband's left his property to wife and wife's left husband $1. Wife died
first, and husband contested the testamentary disposition of her property. The court ex-
tended the doctrine that evidence of an agreement between the spouse could rebut form of
title from dissolution matters to spousal death matters as well. The community property
exception, found only in the Comment to the Law Revision Commission's recommendation,
comports with the holding in Sandrini and progeny. Query how the recordation require-
ment of 683.2 and theory underlying the Sandrini parol agreement exception should affect
the Supreme Court's decision in Propst.
259. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
261. Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App.2d 217, 126 P.2d 118 (1942); King v. King, 107
Cal. App. 2d 257, 236 P.2d 912 (1951); Tenhut v. Boswell, 18 Cal. 3d 150, 157, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 10, 554 P.2d 330 (1976).
262. Rupp v. Kahn, 246 Cal. App. 2d 188, 55 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1966).
263. Courts have found, for example, that neither the creation of a lien not the exe-
cution of a long-term lease vis-a-vis the joint tenancy property effects a severance.
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at the expense of third parties.26 Community property, on the
other hand, is available to the creditors of the decedent. Since one
of the incidents of true community property is free alienability at
death, community property is generally subject to administra-
tion.265 If decedent's community property is administered, not only
is his property subject to the claims of his creditors, but his surviv-
ing spouse's share of the community property may also be availa-
ble to the claims of his creditors. This is true whether or not the
surviving spouse actually receives any or all of the decedent's
share of the community property. The probate code makes it clear
that the debts of the decedent should be allocated to community
and separate property of both of the decedent and surviving
spouse based on the rules that apply to debt liability during mar-
riage. 68 Therefore, payment of decedent's debts is governed by
the debt liability scheme set out in the civil code.2 67
If the surviving spouse receives any or all of the decedent's
property and does not make an election to administer such prop-
erty, the surviving spouse simply steps into the shoes of the dece-
dent.268 To that extent, the probate code states that the surviving
264. As has been pointed out previously, this preference of the surviving joint tenant
recognizes the fact that joint tenant are primarily used in California as a will substitute.
Sterling, supra, note 2, at 940.
265. CAL PROB. CODE § 6401 (West Supp. 1989).
266. CAL PROB. CODE § 11444 (West Supp. 1989) which states in pertinent part
that if the surviving spouse and the personal representative of the decedent cannot agree on
debt allocation, then:
In the absence of an agreement, each debt of the decedent shall be apportioned
based on all of the property of the spouses liable for the debt at the date of the
death. . .,adjusted to take into account any right of reimbursement that would
have been available if the property were applied to the debt at the date of death,
and the debt shall be allocated accordingly.
267. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.010-330 & 5122. Prior to the enactment of section
11444, the allocation of "community debts" between the estate of the deceased and the
surviving spouse was never very clear. Estate of Coffee, 19 Cal. 2d 248, 120 P.2d 661
(1941), the leading case in the area, held that debts of the decedent should be allocated
between the separate and community property on a pro rata or "value" basis. The alterna-
tive theory, proposed first in dictum by the court in Estate of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App.2d
375, 383, 70 P.2d 443 (1938), allocated the debt according to the nature of the debt. This
is the method the legislature has chosen in promulgating section 11444.
268. CAL. PROB. CODE § 13500. This is a universal succession statute that was en-
acted to try to being community property in line with spousal joint tenancies by eliminating
the need for an administration. However, the surviving spouse may elect to probate any or
all of the decedent's community, quasi-community and separate property passing to the
surviving spouse and any of the surviving spouse's community or quasi-community prop-
erty. CAL. CIv. CODE § 13502 (West Supp. 1989). If the decedent leaves a substantial
amount of property to legatees other than the surviving spouse, the 13502 election will
afford the surviving spouse the debt apportionment protection of 11444.
If the surviving spouse does not elect, there may be no administration of the estate
against which a creditor of the decedent can file a claim. However, 13550 makes the sur-
viving spouse personally liable for the debts of the decedent up to the value of all of the
decedent's property which passes to the surviving spouse without administration and the
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spouse is personally liable for the debts of the decedent to the ex.
tent of any community, quasi-community or separate property
that passes to the surviving spouse without administration.
Whether this separate property of Cal. Prob. Code section
13551(c) is intended to include the one-half of the joint tenancy
property belonging to the decedent is not clear. If so, 13551(c) has
impliedly overruled case law exempting such property from the
claims of creditors. 6 9
Since Cal. Civ. Code Section 4800.1 and Cal. Prob. Code Sec-
tion 5305 are inoperative at death, there is no community prop-
erty presumption as to spousal joint tenancies. As to decedent's
property which is administered, creditors of the deceased spouse
should have the same ability to challenge the joint tenancy form
of title by demonstrating the property's community character as a
devisee of such property under decedent's will. 70 Unless section
13551(c) gives creditors of the decedent an express right to satisfy
claim out of joint tenancy property, there is no such right absent a
writing to rebut form of title. In support of that proposition, the
provisions of the probate code that deal with multiple-party ac-
counts specifically find a right of survivorship in the surviving
party or parties as against the estate of the decedent. In spite of
the urging of the Law Revision Commission and various commen-
tators to change the rule which gives the surviving joint tenant a
windfall at the expense of the creditors of the deceased joint ten-
ant,27 2 the legislature has declined to so act. Notwithstanding the
move toward integration of community property and common law
concepts, California's law still looks to form of title of marital
property rather than to its substantive character to determine the
treatment of creditors of a deceased spouse.
C. The Ancestral Property Succession Statutes: California
Code Section 6402.5
As this article has demonstrated the 4800.1 community prop-
erty presumption which attaches to joint tenancy property at mar-
ital dissolution fades away almost completely at the termination of
the marriage at the death of one of the spouses. This is by no
means the end of the story. Like the cheshire cat in Lewis Car-
surviving spouse's community and quasi-community property to the extent that it is not
administered pursuant to 13502. In addition, a community property set-aside is not pro-
tected by the statutory claim limitation period of a formal administration.
269. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 246 for cases extending the doctrine of rebutting form of title to
death cases. But see 5110.730 writing requirement to effect a transmutation.
271. CAL PROB. CODE § 5305 (West Supp. 1989).
272. See Nonprobate Transfers, supra note 186, at 1620-21.
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roll's Alice in Wonderland, the community property presumption
materializes again in the characterization of marital property for
the purpose of applying California's so-called ancestral property
succession statute.2 7a Recently, the Second District Court of Ap-
peals addressed the question of applying the ancestral property
succession statute to spousal joint tenancy property acquired in a
foreign jurisdiction. 74
The ancestral property succession statute is triggered when a
California domiciliary dies wholly or partially intestate leaving no
surviving spouse or issue. It was originally enacted to prevent an
escheat when decedent died leaving no surviving spouse or blood
kin. 5 If there is property in the decedent's estate attributable to
the decedent's predeceased spouse and the time and value require-
ments of 6402.5 are met,278 such property of the decedent attribu-
table to a predeceased spouse will be distributed to heirs at law of
the predeceased spouse rather than to the heirs at law of the dece-
dent. 7 If the ancestral property is the separate property of the
predeceased spouse, such property goes back "in its entirety to the
relatives of said predeceased spouse, and . . . the community
property of the spouses should . . . [is] equally by the relatives of
the predeceased spouse and the relatives of the surviving spouse
since both spouses are deemed to have contributed equally to its
acquisition. 278 In deciding what property is properly attributable
to the predeceased spouse, the court is charged to look beyond the
character of the property immediately preceding its transfer to the
surviving spouse, and instead focus on the underlying fundamental
principle of the ancestral property succession statute-"that the
273. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5 (West Supp. 1989). Section 6402.5 replaces former
CAL. PROB. CODE § 228 and 229.
274. Estate of Luke, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 240 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1987).
275. In 1880, the legislature amended the civil code to provide that as to common
property of the decedent and a predeceased spouse, it would pass to the parents of siblings
of the predeceased spouse who survived the decedent. The statute was later amended to
include the separate property of the predeceased spouse which had come to the decedent by
"gift, devise or inheritance." See generally Reppy & Wright, California Probate Code §
229: Making Sense of a Badly Drafted Provision for Inheritance by a Community Prop-
erty Decedent's Former In-Laws, 8 CoMi. PROP. J. 107 (1981). [hereinafter Reppy, CPC §
229].
276. These time requirements which were added with the enactment of 6402.5 as a
replacement section for 229 make 6402.5 applicable to ancestral property only if the prede-
ceased spouse died no more than 15 years prior to the decedent for the purpose of distribut-
ing real property and no more than 5 years prior to the decedent for personal property.
277. Section 6402.5 is inapposite all other intestate succession statutes in California
which posit a scheme of inheritance based on the decedent's own closest relatives; the
scheme of 6402.5 mandates succession by persons related to the decedent only by marriage
and is founded on feudal principles of "ancestral property." See Reppy, CPC §229, supra
note 275.
278. Estate of Abdale, 28 Cal. 2d 587, 590, 170 P.2d 918, (1946).
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origin or source of the property should determine its distribu-
tion. ' 279 To that extent, it is illuminating to examine the history
of this so-called "source" rule.
In Estate of Abdale, husband, who had originally acquired the
property prior to marriage, converted his separate property to
joint tenancy with his wife after his marriage, thereby making a
separate property gift to her of one-half of his separate property.
At his wife's death, he took title to the whole of the joint tenancy
property by right of survivorship. He subsequently died intestate
and his predeceased wife's son claimed an interest in his estate
under California Probate Code section 229280 based on his
mother's separate property interest in the joint tenancy property
which had passed back to the decedent at his wife's death by right
of survivorship. The court held that section 229 was inapplicable
in this case since the original source of the property at issue was
decedent husband's separate property and that if the husband had
predeceased his wife, at wife's death section 229 clearly would
have been triggered to distribute the predeceased spouse's sepa-
rate property to his kin. "It would be a strange anomaly if, should
he survive her and thereby reacquire the property, on his death
intestate leaving neither spouse nor issue, not his kin but his wife's
would inherit the property under section 229.281
The so-called "source" rule in Abdale had been extensively fol-
lowed by California courts throughout the checkered history of
the ancestral property succession statutes. 2" However, it is not al-
ways so simple to determine the origin or source of property in
order to correctly apply succession statutes.83s In Abdale, Justice
Traynor, writing for the court, held that the proper application of
279. Id. citing Estate of Rattray, 13 Cal. 2d 702, 713, 91 P.2d 1042, 1048 (1939).
The doctrine stated in Estate of Rattray is judicial recognition of favoring substance, that
is the true character of the property, over form of title.
280. Former CPC § 229 read as follows:
If the decedent leaves neither spouse nor issue, and the estate or any portion
thereof was separate property of a previously deceased spouse, and came to the
decedent from such spouse by gift, descent, devise or bequest, or became vested in
the decedent on the death of such spouse by right of survivorship in a homestead
or in a joint tenancy between such spouse and the decedent, such property goes in
equal shares to the children of the deceased spouse and to their decendants by
right of representation, and if none, then to the parents of the deceased spouse in
equal shares, or if either is dead to the survivor, or if both are dead, in equal
shares to the brothers and sisters of the deceased spouse and to their descendants
by right of representation.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Former Cal. Prob. Code § 228, which has been replaced by 6402.5, defines any
community property attributable to the predeceased spouse as ancestral property; former
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the source rule dictated that California Probate Code Section
228218 apply when any portion of the decedent's estate was the
community property of the decedent and previously deceased
spouse and became vested in the decedent at the death of such
spouse by right of survivorship in a joint tenancy between such
spouse and decedent. Traynor reasoned that the legislature in-
tended to look beyond the separate property estate created by a
joint tenancy form of title to the character of its property at its
time of acquisition. In applying the ancestral property succession
the legislature seems to have intended for the time of acquisition
presumption to preempt the joint tenancy form of title presump-
tion. In 1987, this doctrine was again tested by the second dis-
trict's decision in Estate of Luke.
Luke involved a couple who had been domiciled in Illinois and
Iowa during their entire marriage. During the marriage they had
acquired a certain amount of property, some of which they held
title to as joint tenants with right of survivorship. After the wife
died in Iowa in 1978, the husband moved to California where he
was domiciled until his death intestate in 1984. After the hus-
band's death, some of wife's intestate heirs tried to claim a portion
of husband's estate attributable to wife's share of the "community
property" as ancestral property. In classifying the marital prop-
erty, the Luke court found no difficulty in applying the source rule
articulated in Estate of Rattray8 5 and Abdale to the facts of
Luke. Relying on the holding in Estate of Brenneman28" that the
general community property presumption is satisfied by a showing
that the property was "acquired" during marriage, the court in
284. Former CPC § 228 read as follows:
If the decedent leaves neither spouse nor issue, and the estate, or any portion
thereof was community property of the decedent and a previously deceased spouse,
and belonged or went to the decedent by virtue of its commuity character on the
death of such spouse, or came to the decedent from said spouse by gift, descent,
devise or bequest, or became vested in the decedent on the death of such spouse by
right of survivorship in a homestead, or in a joint tenancy between such spouse
and the decedent or was set aside as a probate homestead, such property goes in
equal shares to the children of the deceased spouse and their descendants by right
of representation, and if none, then one-half of such community property goes to
the parents of the decedent on equal shares, or if either is dead to the survivor, or
if both are dead in equal shares to the brothers and sisters of the decedent and
their descendants by right of representation, and the other half goes to the parents
of the deceased spouse in equal shares to the brothers and sisters of said deceased
spouse and to their descendants by right of representation.
285. 13 Cal. 2d 702, 170 P.2d 1042 (1946).
286. 157 Cal. App.2d 474, 321 P.2d 86 (1958). In Brenneman, husband and wife
were married and domiciled in Pennsylvania for the first 15 years of their marriage where
they acquired the intestate property at issue. They moved to California in 1923 where they
continued to be domiciled until wife's death in 1953 and husband's death in 1956. There
was no evidence of any additional earnings of either spouse while domiciled in California.
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Luke found no trouble in reclassifying previously joint tenancy
property as community since it had been acquired during
marriage.287
The real issue in Luke is one barely alluded to: the applicability
of the community property presumption to joint tenancy property
acquired in a common-law state and brought to California by the
surviving spouse who then dies intestate. Relying on the majority
opinion in Estate of Perkins,ss the Luke court simply stated that
the parties had agreed for the purposes of succession that the
courts can reclassify personal property brought into California as
separate or community as if it had been acquired in California.28 9
In Perkins, husband and wife resided their entire 42-year mar-
riage in New York. Husband was a successful banker who made
gifts to his wife of certain securities and life insurance. After his
death in 1931, Mrs. Perkins moved to California bringing with
her the personal property that she had received as intervivos and
testamentary transfers from her husband. At her death intestate
without surviving spouse or issue, Mr. Perkins' son from a former
marriage claimed the decedent's entire estate under Probate Code
section 229. Decedent's three sisters claimed an interest in the es-
tate based on a reclassification of the estate as the community
property of the decedent and her predeceased spouse. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, in a four-three decision, overturned precedent
established in Estate of Allshouse2 90 and held the Allshouse re-
striction on reclassifying marital property inapplicable to sections
228 and 229 since it was inconsistent with the legislative intent of
these sections. "As those statutes affect succession only, their pur-
pose is fully carried out if the probate court distributes the prop-
erty upon the basis of its classification had it been acquired in
California."291
In a strong dissent, Justice Traynor pointed out the logical gap
in the analysis of the Perkins court; that while it was certainly
true that the proper application of sections 228 and 229 required
reclassification of property, there existed no statutory authority
for reclassifying property from a foreign jurisdiction under the
287. The "source" rule inherent in the ancestral property succession statutes dictates
the application of time of acquisition presumption rather than form of title. See supra
notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
288. 21 Cal. 2d 561, 134 P.2d 231 (1943).
289. Estate of Luke at 1012, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
290. 13 Cal. 2d 691, 91 P.2d 887 (1939). The Allshouse court had previously held
that property acquired in a foreign jurisdiction and brought into California by a surviving
spouse could not be reclassified under the California system unless the nature of the foreign
ownership was substantially the same as that which the property would have had if ac-
quired in California.
291. Estate of Perkins at 571, 134 P.2d at 237.
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California ancestral property succession scheme; and that the ma-
jority, in their desire to apply the ancestral property succession
statutes to the facts of Perkins had filled "the gap by the declara-
tion that such a reclassification is implicit in its own construction
of the scope of the legislative purpose.""" As Justice Traynor
pointed out, if the legislature had intended the reach of the ances-
tral property succession statute to include out-of-state property
not otherwise recharacterized as community,293 it would explicitly
have so provided. Absent an express statement, the legislative si-
lence on reclassification should be respected.294
In criticizing the majority's reasoning, Justice Traynor analo-
gized to California's quasi-community property statutues.29 5 Prior
to the enactment of the predecessor provisions to sections 66 and
101, the California Supreme Court had refused to recognize a sur-
viving spouse's rights of succession in property acquired during
marriage by spouses domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction.2 96 How-
ever, Justice Langdon, dissenting in Thornton, invited the legisla-
ture to act by noting the almost universal rule that testamentary
disposition and succession are wholly subject to statutory control
and may be enlarged without constitional scrutiny. 7 In response,
the legislature immediately enacted the predecessor provisions to
current Probate Code sections 66 and 101. As a result of such
legislative action, community property characterization attached
at the death of the acquiring spouse to property acquired in a for-
eign jurisdiction which would have been community property had
292. Id. at 572, 134 P.2d at 237-38. Although CAL PROB. CODE § 101 (West 1989)
(Formerly CAL PROB. CODE § 201.5) establishes a constitutionally permissible legislative
provision for the reclassification of one-half of the quasi-community property at the death
of the decedent, section 101. CAL. PROB. CODE § 101 (West Supp. 1989) is such a statute.
Applies only in the case of a surviving spouse and does not extend to involving heirs other
than a surviving spouse. Estate of Perkins at 575, 134 P.2d at 239. Section 101 is constitu-
tionally permissible since the state of domicile of the decedent has full power to control
rights is succession; no one has a vested right to succeed to another's property rights and no
one has a vested right in the distribution of his estate which may be reordered by the state
for reasons which serve a legitimate state purpose such as protection of family.
In Luke, not only has the statutory gap not been filled, but Mrs. Luke neither resided
nor died in California. The character of the property she accumulated as well as the devo-
lution of such property was controlled by the laws governing characterization and succes-
sion of property of the states of her domicile and death. It was not until after her death and
the succession of her property that her husband moved to California.
293. In Brenneman, husband and wife had both changed their domicile to California
prior to wife predeceasing husband. Therefore, under California quasi-community property
laws, Mrs. Brenneman's property would have been recharacterized at the time of her
death.
294. Estate of Perkins at 572-73, 134 P.2d at 238.
295. Quasi-community property is defined at CPC § 66 and its succession is deter-
mined legislatively by CPC § 101 (West Supp. 1989)




Channick: What's in a Name: A Critical Look at California's System of Chara
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1989
60 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
it been acquired while the spouses were domiciled in California.
While probate code sections 66 and 101 legislatively determine
the character of property acquired in a foreign jurisdiction for
purposes of succession to a surviving spouse, they do not either
explicitly or implicitly apply to anyone other than a surviving
spouse. In addition, section 101 requires that the decedent die
domiciled in California. In Luke, wife died domiciled in Iowa, a
separate property state, and all of her separate property succeeded
to her spouse by the terms of her will or by operation of law.
Therefore, neither of the statutory requirements of section 101
were satisfied. Since California has no additional statutory provi..
sions which speak to the reclassification of foreign property to
community property, the source rule of the ancestral property suc-.
cession statute should be inapplicable here. As the Blair court ob..
served, having essentially disappeared at the death of a spouse, the
sudden reappearance of the community property presumption for
the purpose of applying the ancestral property succession statute
is confusing enough; extending its reach to out-of-state separate
property simply because it was acquired during marriage is truly
Alice in Wonderland logic.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have attempted a critical look at California's
system for characterizing property acquired during a marriage.
Any system that purports to define the property rights of the par-.
ties during marriage must necessarily look to the impact that such
characterization will have in the event that the marriage is dis-
solved, either by death or divorce. In light of the formidable num-
ber of marriages that end in divorce and the fact that, to date,
death is inevitable, it is very important that the parties' rights in
property accumulated during marriage be very clear. To that end,
a marital property system "should at least be a system simple
enough to be generally understood by the people, a system coordi-
nated with the business and governmental orders of the day, and a
system quick and cheap of administration." 298 It should also be a
system which is sufficiently flexible to take into consideration nor-
mal human conduct in marriages. 99
California has been committed since 1850 to a community
property system which has been at least equivocal as to its focus
on marriage creating an equal partnership. It is only within the
298. H. VERRAL & A. SAMMIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 7 (2d ed. 1971).
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last two decades, since the adoption of a system of no-fault di-
vorce in 1970, that the commitment to an equal division of marital
property has become clear.300 Although the evolution of the sys-
tem has been a rocky one, the concept that marriage is an imme-
diate sharing mode which creates ownership rights already in exis-
tence at the end of the marriage comports more readily with the
concept of marriage as a partnership than the equitable distribu-
tion and forced share common law systems 301
A particularly thorny area in California has been the in-tandem
evolution of community property and common law concepts.
Spousal joint tenancies have caused considerable difficulty for
both the legislature and the judiciary. When the concept was first
recognized jurisprudentially in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury, California's commitment to a community property system
was decidedly equivocal; as a result the marital property charac-
terization presumption ran in favor of the common law rather
than the community property estate. As both the legislature and
the courts solidified their commitment to a true sharing system,
the marital property characterization presumption shifted in favor
of the community property estate.
Having resolved prior equivocations regarding its substantive
commitment to the community property system, California's legis-
lature and judiciary must make a similar procedural commitment.
As this article has demonstrated, the state of the law in this area
is woefully confusing and complex, making it unlikely that it can
be understood by the parties whose property interests may be ad-
versely affected. As has been noted by one commentator, "[T]he
real difficulty lies in the fact that, except at the level of the very
wealthy who have competent legal advice. . ., most married per-
sons do not give careful thought to the legal consequences. . ." of
their marital property transactions. 0 2 Since this is inevitably true,
a system of marital property classification should be consistent,
easily comprehended by lay people and embody the expectations
of the majority of parties affected by the system.
This is not an easy task but, at least recently, the California
legislature has shown a commitment to the unraveling of the pro-
cedural complexities of its system. Unfortunately, this commit-
ment has tended to be remedial rather than comprehensive so that
solutions to old problems tend to create new problems. No one
piece of legislation demonstrates this more completely than As-
300. Bruch, California Marital Property, supra note 2, at 771-76.
301. Uniform Marital Property Act (ULA) Prefatory Note (1987).
302. Effland, Arizona Community Property Law: Time for Review and Revision,
1982(1) ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 4 (1982).
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sembly Bill 26. While the express purpose of this legislation was
to simplify and bring consistency to the legal consequences of
spousal joint tenancies, the resulting legislative-judicial brouhaha
has created years of continued, albeit new, complications. The fo-
cus for the foreseeable future will be the determination of whether
the 4800.1 statute of frauds rather than parol evidence should be
applied to the determination of the character of jointly-held mari-
tal property. The unfortunate and certainly unplanned-for result
of A.B. 26 will be to inject less rather than more consistency in
the characterization of marital property and the parties' attendant
rights in the property; the inconsistent treatment of spousal joint
tenancies will inevitably lead to more litigation and a costlier sys-
tem of equitable apportionment of property at the end of
marriage.
One possible remedy would be to repeal 4800.1 and 4800.2 out-
right and substitute thereto a statute similar to California Probate
Code section 5305. Under the terms of section 5305, if parties to a
multiple-party account are husband and wife, the presumption
arises in favor of treating contributions to the account as commu-
nity property.30 3 This presumption may be rebutted either by a
writing to the contrary or by tracing to a separate property
source.30 4 The community property presumption which arises
under such a statute would not effect a transmutation unless the
parties so agreed.305 If such express agreement is found, then the
transmutation has occurred and only another writing will suffice
to effect a second transmutation.
Absent an express agreement to transmute, the function of this
proposed statute would be an evidentiary one to comport with the
intent of the majority of spouses who take title to their marital
assets in joint form. Such a statute would have the effect of favor-
ing the community by treating all jointly-held property, whether
303. The Law Revision Commission Comment to this section states that the legisla-
tive purpose in enacting section 5305 is to comport with the belief of spouses that funds
deposited in a joint account retain their character as community property. A transmutation
does not occur simply by taking title in joint tenancy form. This section also expressly
states that notwithstanding the 5305 community property presumption, at the death of one
of the joint tenants, the surviving joint tenants take the whole by operation of law. CAL.
PROB. CODE § 5305 (West Supp. 1989).
304. For forms of tracing acceptable in California, see See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778,
415 P. 2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966); Marriage of Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 307 (1962).
305. Whether or not a writing constitutes a transmutation of the character of prop-
erty or not is a difficult issue to resolve. In order to facilitate the proof of this issue, all
indicia of ownership such as grant deeds should contain language indicating the require-
ments for effecting a transmutation versus simply taking title to property in one form over
another. This would satisfy the "notice" requirement of section 5110.730 and the legisla-
ture's desire to encourage spouses to memorialize their inter se transactions.
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mixed in character or not, as community property. Only if the
separate property contributor can successfully trace to a separate
property source will such an interest be maintained. Since tracing
requires that the separate property spouse rely on something more
than parol evidence of an agreement to maintain a separate prop-
erty interest, the legislature's objection to the use of parol evi-
dence is satisfied. 308 The requirement of the separate property
contributor to trace is also consistent with the express language of
4800.2 which gives a right of reimbursement to the separate prop-
erty contributor who can successfully trace the contribution to a
separate property source.
The requirement that a separate property contributor trace in
order to rebut the community property presumption seems more
likely to comport with normal conduct during marriage than the
requirement of a separate written agreement. Whereas the re-
quirement to obtain a marital property agreement from one's
spouse seems inimical to the whole notion of the community, the
requirement to maintain records of a separate property contribu-
tion to community property does not seem so onerous. In addition,
the doctrine of tracing in California is so well established that it is
one that spouses can be said to properly rely on. The drafters of
the Uniform Marital Property Act, with the advantage of hind-
sight, adopted a system which permits the maintenance of a sepa-
rate property interest in mixed community and separate property
if the separate property contributor can "unmix" the property by
tracing." °'
Under such a proposed statute, the separate property contribu-
tor who successfully traces should be entitled to pro rata appor-
tionment consistent with the policy that gives pro rata apportion-
ment to the community for contributions to the separate property
of one spouse. Such a system would immediately clarify all the
confusion that has arisen over the legislature's sub silentio adop-
306. Lucas restated what a number of courts had previously held: that a showing of
an agreement to the contrary is necessary to rebut form of title. Although Lucas concerned
a situation of a spousal joint tenancy, the holding of Lucas regarding an agreement seems
to extend to all titled marital property. Evidence of an agreement to rebut form of title
arises from the rationale that affirmatively taking title in a particular form equals a trans-
mutation of the character of the property; therefore, an agreement is necessary in order to
show an intent to transmute to a form other than indicated by title. It seems just as likely
that form of title does not show any intent to transmute but only reflects advice given to
the property owners or a desire to have the advantage of certain incidents of ownership
attendant to particular estates. Bowman v. Bowman, 149 Cal. App. 2d 773, 308 P.2d 906
(1957) If the issue is not transmutation, then the necessity of an agreement to the contrary
is obviated. If the spouse claiming a separate property interest is able to trace, a condition
precedent to relief under section 4800.2 in any case, such spouse should be able to get pro
rata apportionment of his or her contribution.
307. Uniform Marital Property Act (ULA) § 14 (1987).
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tion of an inception of title doctrine as applied to mixed commu-
nity and separate property; it would also provide much needed
consistency regarding reimbursement of each estate in cases of
mixed community and separate marital property.
The adoption of such a statute would also be more consistent
than current law with the intent of the recently adopted transmu-
tation statute which requires a writing to effect a transmutation
but specifically excepts from its purview mixed community and
separate property transactions. 08 Such mixed property transac-
tions continue to be governed by current law which speaks directly
to presumptions regarding mixed property transactions. For exam-
ple, the community property presumption of section 4800.1 ap-
plies to jointly-held property regardless of whether such jointly-
held property is wholly community property or an admixture of
community and separate property. This statute raises a conclusive
presumption of transmutation to community property based on ti-
tle alone which may be rebutted only with a writing demonstrat-
ing either no intent to transmute or a subsequent transmuation to
another form.
On the other hand, section 5110.730, requiring a writing in or-
der to effect a transmutation, is not satisfied unless the spouse
whose interest in the property is adversely affected consents or
agrees to the transmutation. Although not clear from the statute,
such consent or agreement seems to require that the writing be in
such a form that knowledge of the transmutation can rationally be
imputed to the parties. Therefore, the writing must be something
more than merely taking title to marital property in a certain
form; otherwise, the statute is no more than a codification of the
rule articulated in Lucas.309
Assuming that only a knowledgeable writing will effect a trans-
mutation pursuant to section 5110.730,310 a writing which does is
not a knowledgeable writing does not effect a transmutation;
therefore, parol evidence, and particularly a tracing, should be
sufficient to prove the character of property. Where spouses have
specified form of title contrary to character of title but have
shown no intent to transmute, 311 permitting tracing to rebut form
308. CAL CIv. CODE § 5110.730 (West Supp. 1989).
309. Query whether the section 5110.730 writing requirement must be accompanied
by a showing that the transmuter knowingly gave up an interest in his or her property or
whether taking title to property purchased with separate funds as husband and wife is
sufficient to satisfy the writing requirement.
310. See Estate of MacDonald, 213 Cal. App. 3d 456 (1989) where wife's inten-
tional transmutation of her community property interest in husband's IRA was not suffi-
cient to work a transmutation since a standard form was used to effectuate the
transmutation.
311. See note 309 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26
64
California Western Law Review, Vol. 26 [1989], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol26/iss1/2
CHARACTERIZING MARITAL PROPERTY
of title seems analytically correct and logically consistent.
Consistent with the intent of section 5110.730, the mere act of
taking title to property jointly should not raise a conclusive pre-
sumption of transmutation but rather a rebuttable presumption of
the character of the property which may be overcome by tracing
to a separate property source. If, however, the writing is knowl-
edgeable and section 5110.730 has been satisfied, a transmutation
of the character of property has occurred and only another section
5110.730 writing will effect a subsequent transmutation. In the
such a situation, permitting rebuttal of character by tracing is in-
consistent with the legislative intent of abolishing the use of any
evidence other than a writing to transmute the character of mari-
tal property.
Such a change to the law would also comport with both the
expectation of most spouses respecting the character of marital
property and the intent of the legislature in promolugating sec-
tions 4800.1 and 5110.730. If it can be assumed that a gift to the
community of separate property is not likely to be within the con-
templation of the parties at marital dissolution, then the statutory
permissibility of tracing to a separate property source to get pro
rata apportionment makes sense from the spouses' point of view.
The twin legislative purposes of reversing the Lucas gift presump-
tion and encouraging spouses to memorialize in a writing their
transactions respecting marital property are both satisfied as well
but only if the section 5110.730 requires a knowing transmutation.
If simply taking title in a form different from character satisfies
the section 5110.730 writing requirement, then the purpose of the
new transmutation statute is simply to require spouses to memori-
alize all of their property transactions in writing.312
If the legislature is not prepared to repeal 4800.1 outright and
replace it with a statute like Cal. Prob. Code Section 5305, per-
haps an alternative interpretation of section 4800.1 is in order.
Professor Blumberg has suggested that the courts' previous read-
ings of 4800.1 might be overly broad. Instead of effectively ren-
dering the 4800.1 presumption a conclusive one if the statute of
frauds requirement cannot be satisfied to rebut the community
property presumption, a rebuttable presumption of titled commu-
nity property would instead arise. The separate property contribu-
tor would be permitted to rebut such form of title by the showing
of either an oral or written agreement to the contrary. 313
312. The writing requirement of 4800.1 is clearly intended to encourage spouses to
memorialize their intentional transmutations of property in a writing; otherwise the pre-
sumption of community property is conclusive.
313. Blumberg, supra note 12, at 171.
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Such a reading of 4800.1 comports with the legislative intent
underlying both 4800.1 and Cal. Prob. Code Section 5305: that a
writing be required to actually effect a transmutation and that
that writing be a knowledgeable one. Under such a statutory con-
struction, the 4800.1 community property presumption for jointly
titled marital property is not sufficient in itself to work a transmu-
tation of the character of the marital property. Satisfaction of the
4800.1 writing requirement demonstrates the parties' intent that
the 4800.1 community property presumption not work a transmu-
tation but that the character of the property be as the parties
knowingly agreed to in a writing. Alternatively, if no 4800.1 writ-
ing exists, the 4800.1 community property presumption attaches
but does not work a transmutation; instead the separate property
contributor may rebut the presumption by the showing of an oral
or written agreement to maintain a separate property interest a la
Lucas. If an agreement can be shown, the separate property con-
tributor gets pro rata apportionment if he or she can trace to a
separate source. If no agreement can be demonstrated and the
community property presumption cannot be rebutted, then 4800.2
attaches to give to the separate property spouse reimbursement for
traceable separate property.
Even if the legislature adopts one of above suggestions for legis-
lative change, the potential difficulties attendant to survivorship
joint tenancy must still be dealt with. 14 Under the Multiple Party
Accounts section of the California Probate Code, the legislature
has specifically recognized that form of title will be respected for
purposes of distribution of the assets in such accounts at the death
of one of the joint tenants notwithstanding the community prop-
erty presumption that attaches for all other purposes.316 A similar
recognition of survivorship community property seems appropriate
for all other treatment of marital property as well. Spouses should
be made aware of the statutory recognition of this estate. Notice
of the consequences of electing survivorship community property
could be appended to grant deeds and other indicia of title so that
the parties are on aware of the consequences of taking title in
such a manner. This notice should include the fact that although
joint tenancy form of title will be respected at death, for all life-
time purposes, the community property presumption attaches.
Should the legislature decline to adopt either of the above sug-
gested changes to the current statutes respecting the characteriza-
tion of marital property, the proposed notice should also apprise
spouses of the consequences of taking title to marital property in a
314. Estate of Blair, 199 Cal. App. 3d 161, 244 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988).
315. CAL PROB. CODE §§ 5302(a), 5303(a) & 5305(c) (West Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 26
66
California Western Law Review, Vol. 26 [1989], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol26/iss1/2
1989] CHARACTERIZING MARITAL PROPERTY 67
way that does not necessarily reflect the character of the property
and which puts separate property contributions to community
property at risk at marital dissolution since such knowledge is cur-
rently presumed to be within the purview of the parties. As has
been shown repeatedly, knowledge of the consequences of holding
title is without the scope of knowledge of the vast majority of par-
ties whose rights in marital property should be protected rather
than abrogated by the system they opt into. To hold otherwise is
not only to encourage complexity, inconsistency and costly litiga-
tion but inequitable results as well.
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